MAPPING THE CONCEPTS BEHIND THE CONTEMPORARY
LIBERALIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JEAN D’ASPREMONT*
It is hardly groundbreaking to suggest that the international
legal order is enduring the corrosion of one of its most
fundamental pillars: the prohibition on the use of force. Each
controversial use of force by a State has sparked predictions from
international legal scholars envisaging the demise of this
prohibition.1 While it would be inaccurate to conclude that the
prohibition has been completely undermined, recent practice
provides alarming indications that this is precisely the direction in
which the prohibition is heading.
The claim that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is on the brink of
clinical death has already been heard—principally from legal
realists.2 These grim accounts have also been endorsed by some
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1 For an earlier controversy, see the famous debate between Thomas M.
Franck and Louis Henkin. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or:
Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970)
[hereinafter Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?] (arguing that the prohibition against
the use of force has been eroded beyond recognition). But see Louis Henkin, The
Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544, 544
(1971) (arguing that while Article 2(4) is under assault, it is not dead). Franck has
grown even more pessimistic in recent years. See Thomas M. Franck, What
Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 607–08 (2003)
[hereinafter Franck, What Happens Now?] (discussing the relevance of the
conclusion offered in his 1970 article in the context of the war on Iraq, where
American leaders “boldly proclaim a new policy that openly repudiates the
Article 2(4) obligation.”).
2 See generally ANTHONY C. AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
75 (1999) (critiquing positivism by stating that it tends to place too much stock in
the sanctity of treaties and illustrating that critique by citing states’ indifference
toward Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter); Michael J. Glennon, The Collapse of
Consent: Is a Legalist Use-of-Force Regime Possible?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (Beth
A. Simmons ed., 2008); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (2005) (explaining that an action in contravention of the
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liberal scholars.3 Such a bleak outlook has usually been resisted by
those scholars who emphasize the overarching importance of opinio
juris—the belief of States that international law prohibits the use of
force irrespective of any corresponding conventional obligation4—
and interpret the deficiencies of the collective security system as
grave but temporary. These scholars believe that, although Article
2(4) is, at worst, in intensive care, the situation is not life
threatening for the system of collective security.5
Whether on the brink of clinical death or in intensive care,6
Article 2(4) is recognized unanimously as being in a state of grave
weakness. The analysis provided by this Article seeks to assess the
precise extent of the frailty of the prohibition on the use force.
While recognizing that this is not the first time that the demise of
the collective security system has been foreshadowed, this Article
seeks to examine the manner in and the concepts through which the
contemporary enfeeblement of the prohibition on the use force is

U.N. Charter is explained away as the first step in its revision); Anthony C. Arend,
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 99–101
(2003) (conceding that there exist customary prohibitions on the use of force, but
asserting that such prohibitions fail to espouse the strong language of Article
2(4)); Michael J. Glennon, The Rise and Fall of the U.N. Charter’s Use of Force Rules,
27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 508 (2004) (explaining that though nations
have not explicitly renounced Article 2(4), they have violated the U.N. Charter).
3 See Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, supra note 1, at 809 (illustrating the
viewpoint that Article 2(4) rests on its deathbed); Henkin, supra note 1 (discussing
the same proposition). For a pessimistic account from non-liberal scholars, see
Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9, 32 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986)
(concluding that the guarantee to refrain from the use of force, embodied in
Article 2(4), does not work).
4 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99–
100 (June 27) (finding that both parties agree that the principles regarding use of
force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter correspond with principles of customary
international law); see also Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order
in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 622 (2003) (discussing that ideas of how
states ought to behave can survive both “massive deviance” and an “almost total
failure of application”).
5 See Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM.
J. INT’L L. 628, 631–33 (2008) (reflecting on how the Charter’s norms regarding
permissible use of force have created a default rule of nonintervention, which has
helped support global stability).
6 See Emmanuelle Jouannet, French and American Perspectives on International
Law: Legal Cultures and International Law, 58 ME. L. REV. 292, 313–14 (2006) (noting
that cultural differences in the way in which the French and the Americans
establish rules of customary international law are reflected within debates on the
use of force).
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unfolding and the potential impact of that phenomenon on the
international legal order as a whole.
Although this Article does not openly and purportedly
embrace any particular vision of law, it is important to emphasize
at this preliminary stage that each international legal scholar’s
understanding of the state of the law on the use of force—
including the conception spelled out in this Article—remains
deeply affected by each scholar’s respective conception of the rules
regulating the use of force and the aspirations that each has vested
in the collective security system.7 In particular, it could be argued
that the looming enfeeblement of the prohibition on the use of
force that is enunciated in this Article can, to a large extent, be
explained as the outcome of the immoderate expectations vested in
it by many scholars. In this way, it may be that the contemporary
dilution of the prohibition on the use of force is nothing more than
what it naturally ought to be.8 It could simply be the end of the
illusion conveyed by the optimism that followed the end of the
Cold War.9 Accordingly, this Article acknowledges the relativity
of its findings and comes to terms with their utter dependence on
each scholar’s conception of the law and the collective security
system. As a result, this Article has the modest aim of shedding
some light on the state of law ushered in by contemporary
developments with a view to anticipating the consequences of a
complete demise of the prohibition on the use of force for the
international legal order as a whole.
To achieve that goal, this Article follows a two-stage analysis.
The Article starts by investigating the manner in which the

7 On this question see generally Andrea Bianchi, The International Regulation
of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 651 (2009)
for a discussion on why “the method by which the discourse on the use of force is
formed” must be reconsidered in light of diverging interpretative techniques
currently employed by scholars.
8 See Prosper Weil, Le Droit International en Quête de son Identité, 237 RECUEIL
DES COURS 9, 64–65 (1996) (stating that not all problems can be resolved by the law
and suggesting that perhaps the reason why we are often disappointed by
international law is that we expect too much of it). A similar argument
occasionally permeates realist accounts of the collective security system. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 990–91 (2005)
(stating the realist perspective that international law, by overstating claims of its
success and hiding when it fails, has diminished its own progress).
9 See Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 609 (describing Article 2(4)
as “miraculously reborn in a post-Cold War order”).
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prohibition to use force is being incrementally corroded. In
particular, it argues that the evanescence of the rule expressed in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not stem from a conscious
disregard for the prohibition on the use force since most States still
feel constrained by it.
Instead, it is submitted that the
disintegration of the prohibition on the use force results from a
general striving for looser limitations on that prohibition. This
phenomenon is construed here as a liberalization of the use of force.
Once it has been established how the prohibition on the use of
force is being liberalized, this Article engages in a study of its
consequences for the international legal order.
It is important to stress at this point that, having the modest
aim of formulating some thoughts on the forms and impact of a
dilution of the prohibition on the use of force on the international
legal order as a whole, this Article does not strive to contemplate
the reasons why the prohibition on the use of force is vacillating.
The study of the causes of the enfeeblement of that rule has already
been undertaken elsewhere, especially in the realist international
legal scholarship. Yet, such studies have failed to focus on the
question at hand; instead, they have been characterized by a
conflation of the question as to why States obey the law with that
of the existence or obligatory character of the law. Indeed, many
legal realists condition the existence or the obligatory character of
the rule upon the reasons why States abide by its commands.
According to these scholars, should a State no longer have any
reason to abide by a rule, this means that the rule is either
inexistent or no longer obligatory.10 By contrast, this Article rests
on the assumption that the reasons why States abide by legal rules,
their existence and the foundation of their obligatory character are
three different questions, none of which have any direct bearing
upon the subject central to this study. As a result, they are not
examined here. In the same vein, this Article does not seek to
evaluate whether the dilution of the rule enshrined in Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter should be, as a matter of fact, bemoaned nor
does it examine the reasons justifying whether such a rule ought to

10 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 8, at 940 (suggesting that excessive violation
of a rule of international law causes the rule to be replaced); see also Michael J.
Glennon, Force and the Settlement of Political Disputes: Debate with Alain Pellet
at the Colloquium of Topicality of the 1907 Hague Conference (Sept. 7, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092212 (discussing how repeated violations
of international law have affected States’ legal obligations to obey these laws).
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be preserved. Such questions do not fall squarely within the ambit
of legal expertise and are duly set aside for the purposes of this
Article.
Because this Article aims at appraising the forms and the
consequences of the dilution of the prohibition on the use of force
for the international legal order as a whole, Part 1 starts by spelling
out the interconnections between the prohibition on the use of
force, the collective security system, and the international legal
order. The Article then tries to demonstrate that the dilution of the
prohibition on the use of force does not stem from any attempt to
unravel the prohibition itself, but from a general endeavor for
looser limitations to that prohibition. Part 2 accordingly embarks
on an examination of the enduring character of the prohibition on
the use of force. Part 3 then sheds some light on how the use of
force is being dismantled through a severe loosening of its
limitations. Part 4 offers a general appraisal of the extent of the
dilution of the prohibition. In Part 5, the Article eventually
provides some thoughts on the consequences of the vanishing of
the prohibition on the use of force for the international legal order
as a whole.
1.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,
THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM, AND THE PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF FORCE

The international legal order has preceded the emergence of a
collective security system, which itself has preceded the advent of
a prohibition on the use of force. Therefore, these notions are all
autonomous in the sense that none of them is a constitutive
element of the other. In particular, an international legal order
rests neither on the existence of a collective security system, nor of
a prohibition on the use of force. This is well illustrated by the
existence of international legal relations among states long before
the creation of the League of Nations, which is widely considered
the first rudimentary collective security system,11 although its
11 See ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918–
1935, 2 (Atheneum Publishers, 2d ed. 1969) (explaining that the common purpose
of all nations associated with the establishment of the League of Nations was to
construct a security machinery to prevent the recurrence of another World War);
see also C.K. WEBSTER & SYDNEY HERBERT, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 301 (1933) (contending that the League of Nations was primarily
conceived as a “compact to maintain peace”); F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE
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systemic dimension has sometimes been portrayed as an illusion.12
The League of Nations also demonstrated that a collective security
system can be set up without a prohibition on the use of force.13
Although independent from one another, these notions are
intertwined and act to reinforce each other. The most obvious
interconnection among them is the finding that the existence of a
collective security system fosters the viability of the international
legal order as a whole. In essence, the collective security system
can tame and elevate the use of force to an enforcement mechanism of the
international legal order. Indeed, it is not contested that the
collective security system can transform war into a coercive
mechanism that can be used for the enforcement of law. For
Kelsen, this enforcement mechanism even constitutes one of the
constitutive elements of the international legal order.14 There are,
of course, various degrees in which a collective security system can
instrumentalize war with a view to making it a law-enforcement
tool. For instance, the pre-League of Nations collective security
system, founded on the predominance, alliance, and congresses of
the Great Powers, did little to provide an effective law-enforcement
mechanism, for it was crippled by an overly fickle balance of
powers.15 Under the League of Nations, war became a law-

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3 (1952) (stating that the League of Nations is the
“embodiment in constitutional form of mankind’s aspirations towards peace and
towards a rationally organized world”).
12 See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 842, 988
(1987) (illustrating the critical legal school’s belief that the League of Nations
system existed as an illusion to alleviate the frustration of a war fought in vain).
13 See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10–16 (laying out the ways in which
members of the League can deal with acts of aggression or threats of such acts by
other Member States without specifically prohibiting the use of force in
international disputes).
14 See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1952) (explaining
that if there were a total prohibition on the use of force without the possibility of
forcible actions as sanctions, international law would cease to be a legal order);
Jörg Kammerhofer, Kelsen—Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to
International Law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 225, 230–31 (2009) (discussing Kelsen’s
interpretation that war exists as either “delict or sanction within positive
international law”).
15 See F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 301 (1963) (stating that the
displacement of the older power structure by impersonal forces created instability
and tension between the Great Powers in the years prior to the League of
Nations); George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era:
What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 335–36 (1998) (noting that
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enforcement tool only to a limited extent; the League being mostly
devoted to proceduralizing violence rather than instrumentalizing
it.16 By contrast, the U.N. collective security system—although it
was put on hold during the Cold War and was not able to function
properly as a means of enforcement until the fall of the Berlin
Wall17—offers the possibility to use war as an enforcement
procedure.18 To a significant extent, the U.N. system is a structure
devoted to maintaining the international legal order.19 In that
sense, the U.N. mechanism contradicts any Austinian type of
objection that international law is not law because it lacks a
coercive enforcement mechanism.20 While the U.N. collective

the fragmented agreements made by the Great Powers could not have prevented
the Great War).
16 See FÉODOR KORÉNITCH, L’ARTICLE 10 DU PACTE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS
(1931) (discussing Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations). See
generally U.N. LIBRARY AT GENEVA, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1920–1946—
ORGANIZATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: A RETROSPECTIVE OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORLD PEACE, U.N. Doc.
LIB/96/6, U.N. Sales No. GV.E.96.0.25 (1996) (detailing the historical foundations
and developments of the League of Nations).
17 But cf. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950) (illustrating the
operation of the Security Council, an integral part of the U.N. collective security
system, in the face of armed attacks on the Republic of Korea by North Korean
forces). See Nico J. Schrijver, The Future of the Charter of the United Nations, 10 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 11 (2006) (discussing how the end of the Cold War signified
a turning point for the U.N.).
18 See David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299, 317 (2000)
(noting, for example, how the U.S. military took actions tantamount to acts of war
against Iraq during the Gulf War as a means of supporting the “inspection and
sanctions regime” imposed by the U.N. Security Council); see also HANS KELSEN,
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS 736 (1950) (discussing the ability of the Security Council to direct its
action against a state responsible for a threat to peace and is free to determine
what constitutes a threat and then issue a legally binding “order” demanding that
the state take a certain course of action); Kammerhofer, supra note 14, at 245
(explaining that coercive actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII
are not necessarily responses to wrongs by Member States and are therefore not
inconsistent with the Preamble of the Charter).
19 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple—Order, Justice and the U.N.:
A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325 (1995) (detailing the tension between the
goal of maintaining order and that of maintaining justice at the U.N.).
20 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 201 (Hackett Publishing Co., 1998) (positing
that international law is improperly called law because it is set by general opinion,
whereas positive law is set by a sovereign). But see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A
LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 3–43, 93–120 (2d
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security system clearly instrumentalizes war and allows it to be
used as a law-enforcement tool, it must be noted that this is only
true as long as the rule that one seeks to enforce through the U.N.
enforcement procedure dovetails with the objective of peace and
security of the U.N., and more particularly, that the violation of the
rule whose enforcement is sought may potentially constitute a
threat to international peace and security.21 In other words, it is
only as early as the infringement of a given rule simultaneously
constitutes a threat to the international peace and security that one
can contemplate resorting to the U.N. collective security system to
enforce international law.22
The requirement that the enforcement of a rule through the
U.N. system must simultaneously contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security in order for the U.N. collective
security to be deemed a law-enforcement system, should not be
exaggerated.
Recent practice has shown that the qualification of Security
Council resolutions have been loosely applied and have
encapsulated situations where clear violations of international law
have been committed. This is generally the case when the Security
Council seeks to sanction what it qualifies an “aggressive act,” “act
of aggression,” or “aggression.”23 This is also true in the case of a

ed., 1980) (criticizing Austin’s views on legal systems and comparing it with
Kelsen’s theory of legal systems).
21 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”).
22 See id.; see also Pierre d’Argent et al., Article 39, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS
UNIES: COMMENTAIRES ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1133–70 (Jean-Pierre Cot et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2005) (discussing the competence of the Security Council to determine threats
against peace, breach of peace, and acts of agression).
23 See S.C. Res. 326, U.N. Doc. S/RES/326 (Feb. 2, 1973) (addressing what the
Security Council deemed to be “provocative and aggressive acts” committed by
Southern Rhodesia against other countries, including Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, and Zambia); S.C. Res. 387, U.N. Doc. S/RES/387 (Mar. 31, 1976)
(regarding the acts of aggression committed by South Africa against other
countries in southern Africa); S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977)
(regarding the acts of armed aggression committed by mercenaries against Benin);
S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (regarding the acts of aggression
committed by Israel against Tunisia); S.C. Res. 611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (Apr.
25, 1988) (condemning the acts of aggression committed by Israel against Tunisia);
S.C. Res. 667, U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (Sept. 16, 1990) (regarding the acts of
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humanitarian disaster that qualifies as a threat to international
peace and security, or in situations concerning numerous
violations of both humanitarian as well as human rights law.24 It
must be conceded that, in these situations, violations of
international law have never been per se equated by the Security
Council to threats to international peace and security. However,
the Security Council, whose mandate is not to determine whether
international law has been breached, has nonetheless considered
that situations where there have been blatant violations of
international law constitute threats to international peace.25 This is
also clearly the case when sanctions are applied by the Council to
States or entities which have failed to comply with the Council’s
own compulsory injunctions.26 While one can still dispute the
extent to which the U.N. Security Council serves as a coercive
enforcement mechanisms of international law as a whole, it seems
indisputable that the U.N. collective security system can
potentially provide a new avenue for the enforcement of
international law as a whole.
The relationship between the prohibition on the use of force
and the international legal order is probably more difficult to
fathom. Indeed, as was previously stated, a prohibition on the use
of force does not constitute a constitutive element of a legal order.
One can easily conceive of an international legal order that is
devoid of any prohibition on the use of force, as illustrated by the
indisputable existence in international relations of orders that can
reasonably be deemed legal before the advent of any prohibition

aggression committed by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in
Kuwait).
24 For examples of resolutions pertaining to the situation in Kosovo, see S.C.
Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998);
S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (May 14, 1999); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). For the situation in Darfur, see S.C. Res. 1593, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
25 For the situation in Rwanda, see S.C. Res. 929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June
22, 1994), or for the situation in Somalia, see S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733
(Jan. 23, 1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); S.C. Res. 794,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
26 See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (imposing sanctions
on Libya for failing to comply with S.C. Res. 731 (1992)). See generally S.C. Res.
1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) (adopting sanctions against Iran for,
inter alia, failing to comply with S.C. Res. 1696 (2006)).
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on the use of force. This does not mean that the existence or the
absence of a prohibition on the use of force is without
consequences for the international legal order as a whole. This
accords with H.L.A. Hart’s famous assertion that the restriction of
violence constitutes “the minimum content of natural law,” that is,
a rule of conduct that any social organization must contain to be
“viable.”27 That a legal order must somehow limit the use of
violence so as not to be beset by chaos and ineptitude does not
mean that the use of force must necessarily be prohibited. It could
even be argued that the total absence of any legal limitation on the
use of force may be offset by some moral or political postulates and
in fact helps the legal order in question to remain viable. In that
sense, the “just war” moral limitations pre-existing the League of
Nations, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and
the U.N. Charter limitations on the use of force, although falling
short of reflecting legal standards, may have played, together with
the complex pre-League alliances system, the role of limiting the
use of violence and contributing to the viability of the international
legal order as a whole.
A prohibition on the use of force not only helps bolster the
viability of a legal order, it can also be instrumental in the
preservation of some of the main tenets of that legal order. With
respect to the international legal order in particular, it can be
argued that, by forbidding violence among sovereign States, the
prohibition on the use of force is aimed at the preservation of the
Westphalian order. Indeed, what the prohibition is meant to
preserve in this case is a given configuration of the international
community and the legal order that corresponds with it.
According to Article 2(4), States are prohibited from invading,
occupying, annexing, and eliminating other sovereign States.28
27 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193–94 (1961). This statement has often
been abused in order to reconcile Hart and Dworkin and defend the idea that
Hart had eventually elevated some minimum standards of morality into a
condition of validity or a condition of the obligatory character of law. Hart,
however, never construed his “minimum content of morality” as a constitutive
element of valid or obligatory law. For an example of this misinterpretation of
Hart, see Kenneth E. Himma, Hart and Austin Together Again for the First Time:
Coercive Enforcement and the Theory of Legal Obligation 17 (SSRN Working Papers,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=727465.
28 But see Pierre d’Argent, Which Law Through Which War? Law Through War
Revisited, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that although initially prohibiting
war, international law, and most notably the U.N. Charter, has begun to legalize
it).
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Article 2(4) thus shelters the current State-based configuration of
the world and the legal order that rests upon it. This is probably
why the International Court of Justice has long been so prone to
defend a very robust understanding of the prohibition on the use
of force, both in its conventional29 and customary30 dimensions.
As has been contended, the prohibition on the use of force is
not a necessary condition to the legal character of the international
order. Nor is the prohibition on the use of force a constitutive
element of any collective security system. A collective security
system can be set up and prove viable without force being
simultaneously prohibited. This is well-illustrated by the fact that
the League of Nations did not rest on any sort of prohibition, the
use of force only being subjected to some multilateral procedural
requirements under the League System.31 The foregoing means
that a collective security system is entirely conceivable short of any
prohibition on the use of force and the relationship between the
prohibition and the collective security system is not one of mutual
reinforcement. The opposite could even be reasonably defended.
It can be argued that the prohibition on the use of force can
actually hinder the efficacy of a collective security system. Indeed,
if utterly unqualified—that is if the prohibition does not allow any
multilateral use of force—the prohibition on the use force can even
demote the collective security system to a mere political forum
where questions of peace and security are discussed but no police
measures can be taken. It is well known that the current
prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, which mirrors customary international law,32 only limits
the use of force and does not prohibit it completely, for the rule
contains an exception both outside and inside the U.N. collective

29 See Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit., N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (stating
that the alleged “right of intervention” is a “manifestation of a policy of force”
which “cannot . . . find a place in international law”).
30 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97–
101, paras. 184–90 (June 27) (holding that customary international law requires the
non-use of force).
31 See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10–16 (offering only an advisory role
in responding to military activity).
32 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 92–98, paras. 172–85
(holding that the United States’ argument that the U.N. Charter is the sole basis
upon which claims of international law may be made is incorrect).
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system.33 In that sense, it is only as long as the prohibition on the
use of force leaves room for exceptions in the form of multilateral
uses of force that it allows an efficacious collective security system
to exist.
The prohibition on the use of force, although neither a
constitutive element of any legal order nor of any collective
security system, nonetheless has the ability to impact the viability,
efficacy and configuration of both the international legal order and
the collective security system. Accordingly, the last part of this
Article appraises the impact of the dilution of the prohibition on
the use force on each of these notions. First, however, such an
appraisal requires a preliminary assessment of both the extent of
the actual enfeeblement of the prohibition on the use of force and
of its impact on the collective security system.
2.

AN ENDURING PROHIBITION

Recent practice, especially that pertaining to the so-called fight
against terrorism,34 has provided some worrisome examples of
situations in which the use force by a State short of any
authorization by the Security Council has remained unchallenged.
If the blatant trumping of international law in Kosovo35 and Iraq36
constituted the only exceptions, one could still live with the
illusion of an international legal order where force remains strictly
prohibited despite occasional patent violations. However, the
violations of the prohibition of the use of force in Kosovo and Iraq
have been corroborated ever since.

33 See infra note 65 (detailing those circumstances when the use of force is
permitted).
34 See P. Klein, Le droit international à l’épreuve du terrorisme, 321 RECUEIL DES
COURS 203 (2006) (assessing the legal problems pertaining to the use of force in the
context of the fight against terrorism).
35 See generally KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL
ASSESSMENT (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002) (examining the future of Kosovo in
light of the Security Council resolution 1244 of 1999 and the Stability Pact adopted
to ensure economic recovery of the entire region).
36 See generally Richard A. Falk, What Future for the U.N. Charter System of War
Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 590 (2003) (describing the United States’
circumvention of the U.N.’s prohibition of force in Iraq); Franck, What Happens
Now?, supra note 1 (describing the self-interest of super-powers winning out over
international obligations, post-Iraq). See also John Yoo, International Law and the
War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2003) (reconciling the war in Iraq with the
principles of international law).
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Recently, in an attack first attributed to the United States,37
Israel used force in Sudan without stirring much debate or
condemnation and without clearly falling within the classical rules
of self-defense.38 Likewise, since Israel bombed alleged nuclear
sites in Syria in September 2007, there has hardly been any
response questioning the legality of the Israeli bombardment.39
The possible covert development of nuclear weapons on the site
has not even been invoked as a possible justification.40 In the same
vein, when Turkish troops swept into Iraqi Kurdistan, there were
very few States challenging the legality of the Turkish
intervention.41 By the same token, recent military operations by
foreign troops in Somalia have stirred no concern as to their
accordance with international law.42
These few particular
examples have been corroborated by some principled positions
expressed by States. For instance, some powerful nations have
unwaveringly professed that they do not feel bound by any sort of
constraints when their security is at stake.43 It is also noteworthy
that the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002
famously provides enormous leeway for the President to use force
to prevent acts of terrorism on the exclusive basis of a selfassessment of the threat without any reference to the classical
37 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Says U.S. Airstrike Killed Dozens in Convoy,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 27, 2009, at 5 (describing the confusion of whether the
attacks on Sudan were undertaken by the United States or Israel).
38 See Israel Hit Convoy in Sudan, US Officials Say, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28–
29, 2009.
39 See David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Analysts Find Israel Struck a Syrian
Nuclear Project, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A1 (questioning Israel’s justifications
for attacking Sudan).
40 See U.N. Detects Processed Uranium at Syrian Site, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb.
20, 2009 (reporting that recent samples taken by the International Atomic Energy
Agency have shown signs of processed uranium on the site).
41 See Sebnem Arsu & Stephen Farrell, Turkey Says Its Raids in Iraq Have Killed
More Than 150 Kurdish Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A8 (debating the
grounds for the airstrike).
42 Somali Rebels Slam U.S. Killing of al Qaeda Suspect, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2009, at
1, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF424326.
43 See Press Release, The White House, President George Bush Discusses Iraq
in National Press Conference (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html
(“I
am
confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if
we need to act, we will act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to
do so. . . . When it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s
permission.”).
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conditions of self-defense.44 Under this view, modern threats and
the development of tactical weapons seemingly conveyed the
illusion of so-called “chirurgical” strikes with few causalities,45 had
liberated States from the burden of international law and
convinced them that their imperative political motives can more
easily outweigh their obligation not to use force under the U.N.
Charter.
However ominous this practice may appear, it is argued that
the silence of the international community in these cases does not
suffice to demonstrate a complete disintegration of the prohibition
on the use of force.46 First, the violations of the prohibition
constitute the only tangible practice available. The extent to which
States consciously refrain from using force is imperceptible,
impalpable, and hence, immeasurable.47 Moreover, States still
seem to manifest a significant attachment to the principle of the
prohibition on the use of force. Despite some notable recent
exceptions,48 States using force in ambiguous circumstances still

44 See Press Release, The White House, National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/15538.pdf (providing an overview of America’s
international strategy); Falk, supra note 36, at 593 (describing the leaning of
powerful nations to feel exonerated from the prohibition to use force); see also
Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 619 (finding that the U.S.’s National
Security Strategy redefined the concept of self-defense to take into account the
exigencies of modern terrorism).
45 See Anthony D’Amato, Megatrends in the Use of Force, in 71 INT’L L. STUDIES,
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 1–16 (Michael N.
Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., Naval War College) (1998) (describing these
developments).
46 See Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L 621, 622-27 (2003) (describing the impact of violations on the
state of the law and indicating that use of force does not suggest and erosion of
international law).
47 See ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 180 (Routledge 1993) (“While it is
easy to count the times that a particular norm is violated, it is quite difficult to
identify the times when a norm exerted a controlling influence, when states
refrained from forcible action because of Article 2(4)’s proscription.”).
48 See generally Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 608 (arguing that
nowadays, states do not even bother to use a “fig leaf of legal justification”). Also
note the particular example provided by the Special Commission of Investigation
about the decision of the Netherlands to support the war against Iraq which
concluded that the Netherlands deemed it unnecessary to seek a mandate from
the Security Council. Gilbert Kreijger, Iraq Invasion Had No Legal Backing: Dutch
Report, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2010, at 1, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid
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strive to justify their deeds by referring to the rules of international
law pertaining to the use of force.49 Recent and authoritative
scholarly work further underpins that conclusion.50
This
continuous attachment to the prohibition on the use of force,
however, does not mean that the aforementioned examples are
negligible and marginal. Indeed, it is argued here that the
utilizations of force referred to above betray the deep ailment of
the collective security system, which is being undermined by a
fading prohibition on the use of force.
Legal scholars are divided regarding the normative status of a
prohibition on the use of force, that is, whether the prohibition
constitutes a peremptory norm of international law. Indeed, there
is no scholarly consensus on whether the prohibition on the use of
force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter constitutes a
peremptory norm of international law.51
There is also
disagreement as to the normative character of the rule regulating
self-defense.52 Such a controversy seems to have pervaded the
work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”). Indeed, the
=USTRE60B3A620100112 (reporting on the Dutch government’s support of a
United States led invasion of Iraq that had no legal backing).
49 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar, v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para.
186 (June 27) (noting that a state’s use of rules and exceptions to rules to defend its
use of force confirms rather than weakens the rule); U.K. Foreign Secretary, Iraq:
Legal Basis for the Use of Force, 2003 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 793, 793–96 (describing the
use of force following the liberation of Iraq).
50 See generally OLIVIER CORTEN, LE DROIT CONTRE LA GUERRE: L’INTERDICTION
DU RECOURS À LA FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL CONTEMPORAIN (Pedone 2008)
(claiming that the rule prohibiting the use of force has undergone significant
change since September 11, 2001).
51 See U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2) (1996) available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk
/projects/state_responsibility_document_collection.php#4 [hereinafter Articles on
State Responsibility] (containing the former Article 19 of the ILC which seems to
indicate that only the prohibition of aggression is ius cogens); see also
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/589 (Jan. 28, 2002) (containing Article 27 of the
Articles on State Responsibility, which excludes the invocation of circumstances
precluding wrongfulness in case of violation of peremptory norms, if read in
conjunction with Article 22, Article 27 seems to limit the peremptory character to
the prohibition of aggression).
52 See Antonio Cassese, Article 51, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES,
COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1357 (Jean-Pierre Cot et al. eds.) (2005). Cf.
Raphaël van Steenberghe, Le Pacte de non-agression et de défense commune de l’Union
africaine: entre unilatéralisme et responsabilité collective, 113 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT
INT’L PUB. 125 (2009).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1104

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:4

ILC itself has been alternating between asserting that it is endowed
with a ius cogens character,53 that the status is to be reserved to the
prohibition of aggression,54 or that it did not need to take a position
on the issue.55 Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility
seems to consider the prohibition on the use of force as one of the
peremptory obligations of international law.56 It would be of no
avail to take on that debate here.57
For the sake of this Article, it suffices to underscore that, at first
glance, it may seem odd, if not paradoxical, that scholars are
quibbling over the peremptory character of the prohibition at a
time when the collective security system is deeply damaged.
Largely, the attribution of a peremptory character to the
prohibition on the use of force reflects the whims of a legal
scholarship that is deluded by the constitutionalist character of the
U.N. Charter58 and which sees in the prohibition on the use of force
the overarching principle of an emerging international
constitutional order.59
53 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-second
Session, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 169, 270 (1980) (stating that the Commission was
unsure as to whether communications were made and whether they were
operative).
54 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51 (containing the former
Article 19 which prohibits force except in the most serious of circumstances).
55 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second
session, 35 GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 27–28, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in 2
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 26 U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2)
(discussing the ILC’s work of codifying the rules governing State responsibility).
56 See
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 50
(“Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) The obligation to refrain from the threat or
use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Obligations for
the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) Obligations of a humanitarian
character prohibiting reprisals; (d) Other obligations under peremptory norms of
general international law.”).
57 For an extensive discussion of the question, see CORTEN, supra note 50, at
293–385 (discussing the use of force in contemporary international law).
58 See,
e.g., BARDO FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS
CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1 (2009) (addressing the legal
consequences of viewing the U.N. charter as a constitution for the international
community).
59 See generally Jean d’Aspremont, International Law in Asia: The Limits to the
Western Constitutionalist and Liberal Doctrines, 13 ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L., 89 (2008)
(criticizing the constitutionalist understanding of international law); Jean
d’Aspremont, The Foundations of the International Legal Order, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L
L. 1, 7 (2007) (challenging the idea of a constitutionalist legal order); Wouter
Werner, The Never Ending Closure: Constitutionalism and International Law, in
NIKOLAUS K. TSAGOURIAS, TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL
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This squabbling over the peremptory character of the
prohibition on the use of force is not deemed futile here because of
the very modest consequences of ius cogens in international law. It
is true that ius cogens only invalidates subsequent conflicting
conventions,60 terminates prior conflicting conventions,61 obliges
States not to recognize its serious breach and to cooperate to put an
end to it,62 and bars the invocation of circumstances precluding
wrongfulness in case of a breach.63 However limited and modest,
the effects of ius cogens may prove to be fundamentally important
to the limitations to the prohibition on the use of force. The
determination of the normative character of the prohibition on the
use of force is of fundamental avail in other respects. Indeed, the
question whether circumstances precluding wrongfulness—
especially the state of necessity64—may be invoked to exclude the
wrongfulness of an illegal use of force creates a new possibility for
States to illegally use force without incurring responsibility. We
shall briefly revert to this issue in the next section.
The reason why the debate about the peremptory status of the
prohibition on the use of force seems somewhat overblown
pertains to the assumption made here that the peremptory
character of the prohibition to use force does not constitute a
rampart against the current challenges of the collective security
system. In other words, even if the prohibition on the use of force,
on which the collective security system rests, were to be a norm of
ius cogens, its peremptory character would not shield it against the
perils brought about by attempts to enlarge its limitations. It is
precisely because of the irrelevance of the ius cogens character of
EUROPEAN MODELS 329 (Cambridge University Press 2007) (using
constitutionalist language to explain existing developments in international law).
60 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of international law.”).
61 See id. art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and
terminates.”).
62 See Responsibility of States, supra note 51, art. 41 (“A State whose conduct
constitutes an internationally wrongful act having a continuing character is under
die obligation to cease that conduct, without consequences of invoking prejudice
to the responsibility it has already incurred.”).
63 See id. art. 27 (discussing a circumstance precluding wrongfulness).
64 See id. art. 25 (explaining that breach of an international obligation starts at
the moment that act begins).
AND
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the prohibition in relation to the possibility of stretching its
limitations that it is fundamental to gauge the extent to which
States have resorted to abusive understandings of these limitations.
It is the aim of the following section to describe the debilitation of
the collective security system that originates in attempts to broaden
the limitations under which a resort to force is allowed.
3.

SUBVERTING THE LIMITATIONS TO THE PROHIBITION TO USE
FORCE

This section sketches out the concepts through which the
current liberalization of the use of force is being carried out. It
does not seek to offer comprehensive analysis of each one, for this
has already been done in the literature. However, general
mappings of the various conceptual manners in which the
prohibition to use force is being liberalized in contemporary
international law are scarce. The following paragraphs intend to
fill that gap.
A preliminary remark must be formulated about terminology.
This Article construes the situations where force can legally be
used under current international law as “limitations.” The term
“limitation” seems better suited than the term “exception” or
“qualification” in the sense that the situations where the use of
force is allowed do not, strictly speaking, derogate from the
prohibition. They simply limit its ambit. Likewise, the situations
where force can lawfully be used, although being enshrined in
provisions scattered throughout the entire U.N. Charter, can be
seen as constitutive parts of a single rule. Envisaging the
prohibition on the use of force as one single legal rule embracing
the multilateral use of force authorized by the Security Council as
well as the concept of self-defense enshrined in both Article 51 and
customary international law also underpins the use of the term
limitation instead of exception. Such terminology is also reflected
in the case law of the International Court of Justice, which, in its
decision in the Oil Platforms case, ceased to consider self-defense an
exception to the prohibition to use force and qualified it a
“limitation.”65
65 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183 (Nov. 6) (“[i]f a measure
is to be qualified as self-defence . . . the criteria of necessity and proportionality
must be observed.”). It is interesting to note that prior to that judgment, the Court
considered self-defense an “exception” to the prohibition on the use of force. See
Pierre d’Argent, Du Commerce à l’Emploi de la Force: L’Affaire des Plates-Formes
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The attempt by States to justify their use of force (or their
intention to do so) through a resort to the limitations to the
prohibition has manifested itself in two ways. First, States have
invoked new limitations to justify their resort to military force. In
particular, they have referred to the concept of humanitarian
intervention as well as that of pro-democratic intervention to
support the legality of their military action. At the same time, they
have been prone to broadening the scope of the existing
limitations, namely the right to use force in self-defense or upon
prior authorization by the Security Council. Besides invoking new
limitations or expanding existing limitations, States have also tried
to argue that their use of force is not prohibited by Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter and the corresponding customary rule because
they have been invited by the State’s government onto the territory
on which force is actually used. Finally, even when their actions
are undoubtedly at odds with the prohibition on the use of force
and do not fit into one of its exceptions, States have tried to evade
the correlative responsibility for their illegal conduct by invoking
circumstances precluding wrongfulness, and particularly the state
of necessity. Each of these arguments has gained much credence
among States as well as legal scholars, which explains why each of
them must now be examined briefly.
It is important to point out, preliminarily, that resorting to the
aforementioned arguments is not an entirely new phenomenon.
On the contrary, contemporary endeavors to float new limitations
on the prohibition on the use of force, to stretch the ambit of the
current limitations, to deem oneself duly invited by the
government, or to evade responsibility by invoking a state of
necessity, convey a strong sense of “déjà vu.” Indeed, as was
demonstrated by the practice during the Cold War, these
arguments were always heard when the Security Council was
structurally paralyzed. This is not to say that the Security Council
is now utterly passive and incapable of authorizing the use of
force. When it comes to ordering economic sanctions against
States,66 groups of individuals,67 lone individuals,68 or to policing
Pétrolières (Arrêt sur le Fond) [Trade in the Use of Force: The Oil Platforms Case
(Decision on the Merits)] 49 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 266 (2003)
(discussing the Oil Platforms Case and its implications on international trade).
66 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 986, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995) (setting
forth the Oil-for-Food program in Iraq).
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the seas,69 recent practice has shown that the Council is extremely,
if not overly, active,70 being sometimes oblivious to the elementary
requirement of the rule of law.71 The resemblance between today’s
practice and the immobility of the Council during the Cold War
nonetheless lies in its lasting reluctance to yield to the request for
authorizations from its most bellicose members. After a short
interlude in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the Council has quickly reverted to evincing great prudence and is
now very loathe to rubber-stamp the plans of its warmongering
members. It is the latter which, when confronted with the
Council’s great tepidity to authorize the use of force, have been
most prone to subvert the limitations to the prohibition on the use
of force in order to justify their resort to armed force. At a time
when the Security Council was constantly idle, the harm caused by
these arguments was limited. However, since the end of the Cold
67 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)
(addressing international terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1698, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1698 (July 31, 2006) (explaining that the situation in the Congo is a threat
to international security and peace in the region); S.C. Res. 1804, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1804 (Mar. 21, 2008) (demanding that armed groups in Congo lay down
their arms); S.C. Res. 1807, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1807 (Mar. 31, 2008) (describing
the situation in the Congo).
68 See, e.g. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004)
(discussing the situation in Cote d’Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) (discussing the situation in Darfur); S.C. Res. 1706, ¶
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (deciding to support implementation of
the Darfur peace agreement).
69 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008)
(deciding to cooperate with the TFG to fight armed robbery and piracy off the
Somalian coast).
70 See Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.
901, 902 (2002) (describing how the Security Council departed from its previous
practice in responding to September 11, 2001); Stefan Talmon, The Security Council
as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 177 (2005) (explaining that only generic
resolutions should be described as international legislation).
71 On the debate over the infringement of human rights by the U.N. Security
Council and its effect in the regional legal orders, see Larissa van den Herik, The
Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of the
Individual, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 797, 797 (2007) (discussing regional legal orders
and the infringement of human rights); Michael Bothe, Security Council’s Targeted
Sanctions Against Presumed Terrorists: The Need to Comply with Human Rights
Standards, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 541 (2008) (arguing for due process procedures
for listing decisions and remedies against listing decisions). On the specific
problems caused by the implementation of these measures, see Jean d’Aspremont
& Frederic Dopagne, Kadi: The ECJ’s Reminder of the Elementary Divide Between
Legal Orders, 5 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 371, 371–79 (2008) (describing the problems
caused by implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions).
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War, the Security Council has no longer been paralyzed and has
proved itself to be a fully workable machine. In this context, the
impact of the subversion of the limitations to the prohibition on the
use of force is disastrous for the collective security system as a
whole. It is precisely for this reason that the contemporary practice
described below, while not entirely unprecedented, carries far
more dramatic consequences.
3.1. New Limitations?
Practice shows that States have not balked at resorting to two
new limitations to the prohibition on the use of force alien to the
U.N. collective security system: humanitarian intervention and
pro-democratic intervention. In addition, albeit in veiled terms,
the International Court of Justice as well as the Institut de Droit
international have both alluded to an additional limitation to the
prohibition contained in the U.N. Charter, namely the possibility of
measures involving the use of force in reaction to an initial use of
force which falls below the threshold of an armed attack. Since
most of these limitations have already received extensive attention
in the existing literature, these three limitations to the prohibition
to use force are only outlined briefly.
3.1.1.

Humanitarian Intervention

The most common non-U.N. limitation to the prohibition on
the use of force on which States have relied to justify their
unauthorized military actions is humanitarian intervention.72
Although it has been expressly invoked by some States73 and
supported by some scholars,74 it seems uncontested that positive
72 See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (OUP, 2001) (discussing humanitarian
intervention and the U.N. Charter).
73 See KREIGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 25 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) (discussing
the U.N. commission on Human Rights).
74 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS, 135–69 (Cambridge University Press, 2002)
(addressing humanitarian intervention). Compare Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N.,
and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 14–21 (1999) (discussing a
change in the relationship between the U.N. and NATO to competition and away
from reinforcement), with Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving
towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the
World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 23 (1999) (“[W]here a number of stringent
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international law does not enshrine anything close to an
entitlement to use force in the case of a humanitarian disaster on
the territory of another State.75 Even the vague political concept of
the responsibility to protect falls short of recognizing any
entitlement to use force in the absence of a Security Council
authorization.76
3.1.2.

Pro-Democratic Intervention

Another limitation that has been expressly or impliedly
resorted to in practice is the concept of pro-democratic
intervention. According to this idea, States would be entitled to
use force against another State in order to oust a non-democratic
government. The argument was invoked on the occasion of the
American intervention in Grenada.77 Additionally, it was not
totally absent from the political discourse in the aftermath of the
war in Iraq in 2003 when the argument pertaining to preventive
self-defense began to unravel.78
However, pro-democratic
intervention rarely constitutes an autonomous justification for the
use of force that would otherwise be illegal. Practice shows that it
is usually invoked to complement other arguments when
circumstances leave great doubts as to the legality of the impugned
action. Be that as it may, similar to humanitarian intervention, it is
hardly debatable that the concept has failed to garner enough

conditions are met, a customary rule may emerge which would legitimize the use
of force by a group of states in the absence of prior authorization by the Security
Council.”).
75 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 51 (3d ed.,
2008) (discussing civil wars and the use of force); CORTEN, supra note 50, at 792
(discussing the use of force in contemporary international law).
76 See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging
Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 102 (2007) (clarifying legal norms surrounding
the responsibility to protect).
77 See Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada: A
Ten-Year Retrospective, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 765, 816 (1993) (observing that legal norms
were not altogether ignored in the decision to invade Grenada); RUSSELL
CRANDALL, GUNBOAT DEMOCRACY: U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC, GRENADA, AND PANAMA 105–62 (2006) (discussing the invasion of
Grenada).
78 See, e.g., Statement of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 74 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 793–96 (2003).
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support to constitute a new customary limitation to the prohibition
on the use of force.79
Even though they do not presently reflect customary
international law, the concepts of humanitarian and prodemocratic interventions are very symptomatic of just how
unabashed some States may be when it comes to justifying a
conduct whose illegality is so evident. Moreover, despite their
dramatic potential for abuse, it certainly cannot be excluded that
these limitations to the prohibition on the use of force may
someday gain enough currency to constitute positive law, thereby
further unraveling the prohibition on the use of force.
3.1.3.

Military Counter-Measures

States injured by a violation of their rights are entitled to react
by infringing some obligations that they owe to the author of the
wrongdoing. This is what is commonly called, under the Law of
State Responsibility, a “counter-measure.”80 It is well known that
Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility prohibits military
counter-measures, that is, reactions of injured States that could
involve a violation of the prohibition on the use of force. By
carefully carving the substantive limits of the types of countermeasures that may be utilized by injured States, the International
Law Commission aimed to reflect the classical limits of the
prohibition on the use of force.81
Despite this clear legal framework, it is startling that the
International Court of Justice as well as the Institut de Droit
79 See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, L’ETAT NON DÉMOCRATIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
316–26 (Pedone 2008) (discussing non-democratic states in international law). On
the absence of a right to use force to restore democratic governance in the
framework of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, see
Marco Roscini, Neighbourhood Watch? The African Great Lakes Pact and ius ad bellum,
69 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 931,
955-58 (2009).
80 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 22 (addressing
exhaustion of local remedies). The term “counter-measures” was first coined by
the International Arbitral Tribunal in the case of Air Service Agreement of 27
March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 1978 R.I.A.A. XVIII, 417, 417 (Dec. 9).
81 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 50 (discussing
prohibited countermeasures); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES 288–89 (2002) (addressing Article 50 and obligations that are not
affected by counter-measures).
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international have both hinted at the possibility of taking countermeasures involving the use of force even though they restrict their
comments to narrowly defined situations. For instance, in the
Nicaragua case, the Court contended that “[i]t might however be
suggested that, in such a situation, the United States might have
been permitted to intervene in Nicaragua in the exercise of some
right analogous to the right of collective self-defense, one which
might be resorted to in a case of intervention short of armed
attack.”82 Later, the Court stated that:
[t]he acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming
them to have been established and imputable to that State,
could only have justified proportionate counter-measures
on the part of the State which had been the victim of these
acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They
could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State,
the United States, and particularly could not justify
intervention involving the use of force.83
It is acknowledged that the hints the Court made at the possibility
of resorting to forceful counter-measures are beset with ambiguity,
and it would be an exaggeration to infer from them any clear
conclusion. However, the interpretation giving rise to the right to
take military counter-measures in case of attacks of lesser intensity
has also been endorsed by Judge Simma in his separate opinion to
the decision of the Court in the Oil Platforms case, an opinion which
is worth reproducing here:
I am less satisfied with the argumentation used in the
Judgment by which the Court arrives at the—correct—
conclusion that, since the Iranian mine, gunboat or
helicopter attacks on United States shipping did not
amount to an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article
51 of the Charter, the United States actions cannot be
justified as recourse to self-defense under that provision.
The text of paragraph 51 of the Judgment might create the
impression that, if offensive military actions remain below
the—considerably high—threshold of Article 51 of the

82 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110
(June 27).
83 Id. at 127.
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Charter, the victim of such actions does not have the right
to resort to—strictly proportionate—defensive measures
equally of a military nature. What the present Judgment
follows at this point are some of the less fortunate
statements in the Court’s Nicaragua Judgment of 1986. In
my view, the permissibility of strictly defensive military
action taken against attacks of the type involving, for
example, the Sea Isle City or the Samuel B. Roberts cannot be
denied. What we see in such instances is an unlawful use
of force “short of’ an armed attack (“agression armée”)
within the meaning of Article 51, as indeed “the most grave
form of the use of force[.”] Against such smaller-scale use
of force, defensive action—by force also “short of’ Article
51—is to be regarded as lawful. In other words, I would
suggest a distinction between (full-scale) self-defence
within the meaning of Article 51 against an “armed attack”
within the meaning of the same Charter provision on the
one hand and, on the other, the case of hostile action, for
instance against individual ships, below the level of Article
51, justifying proportionate defensive measures on the part
of the victim, equally short of the quality and quantity of
action in self-defence expressly reserved in the United
Nations Charter. Here I see a certain analogy with the
Nicaragua case, where the Court denied that the hostile
activities undertaken by Nicaragua against El Salvador
amounted to an “armed attack” within the meaning of
Article 51, that would have given the United States a right
to engage in collective self-defence, and instead qualified
these activities as illegal military intervention. What the
Court did consider permissible against such unlawful acts
were “proportionate counter-measures[,”] but only those
resorted to by the immediate victim.84
The Institut de Droit international alluded to that possibility as well.
Indeed, in its 2007 Santiago Resolution on Present Problems of the
Use of Armed Force in International Law, it indicated that:

84 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 331–32 (Nov. 6) (separate
opinion of Judge Simma).
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An armed attack triggering the right of self-defense must be
of a certain degree of gravity. Acts involving the use of
force of lesser intensity may give rise to countermeasures in
conformity with international law. In case of an attack of
lesser intensity the target State may also take strictly
necessary police measures to repel the attack.85
Here is not the place to discuss whether resorting to defensive
military measures would be an appropriate response for States
which are victims of attacks not amounting to armed attacks. It is
more interesting to note that this veiled support for a new
limitation to the prohibition on the use of force has not emanated
from States but from judges and scholars. Indeed, States have
generally stuck to the discourse of self-defense, even when their
action was not following the logic of self-defense.86
It should be noted that the idea of military counter-measures
certainly gives rise to fewer possibilities of abuse than
humanitarian intervention and pro-democratic intervention. It
could also be argued that it is because of the lack of entitlement to
take defensive military counter-measures that States have tried to
disguise their defensive military measures as humanitarian
intervention or pro-democratic intervention. Nevertheless, the
only relevance for this Article of these weighty pronouncements of
the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) and the Institut de Droit
international in favor of military counter-measures lies in their
potential, despite their ambiguity, to further dilute the prohibition
on the use of force.
3.2. Loosening Existing Limitations?
Under current international law, force is permitted if it has
been authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII after a
finding of the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach to the
85 Institut de Droit International, Present Problems of the Use of Armed Force
in International Law, Res. 10A (Oct. 27, 2007), available at http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2007_san_02_en.pdf.
86 See TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 203–04 (2005) (distinguishing between armed reprisals and
pre-emptive self-defense); GRAY, supra note 75, at 197–98 (stating that the selfdefense attacks by the U.S. and Israel may have been more than defensive);
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 359, 382
(2009) (noting that offensive military attacks have been justified using selfdefense).
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peace, or an act of aggression. It is also allowed without prior
authorization of the Council if a State has been the victim of an
armed attack and it is necessary to repel the attack. When they do
not propose new limitations, States try to fit their behavior within
the ambit of these two existing hypotheses by audaciously
stretching their limits.
3.2.1.

Abusing Past Security Council Authorizations

As was alluded to earlier, the Security Council, while clearly
coming back to life after the end of the Cold War, has quickly
returned to acting with great prudence and now proves reluctant
to authorize the use of force preferring instead to authorize nonforceful measures. The Council’s aversion to the authorization to
use force is not solely the result of the classical reluctance of vetowielding powers like the People’s Republic of China or the Russian
Republic to give permission for multilateral uses of force. The
misgivings of these countries vis-à-vis the requests for
authorization submitted by other member States can, in large part,
be traced to the fallout caused by a few States’ abuse of
authorizations of force granted by the Security Council in the early
1990s.87 In particular, the multiple attempts—especially by the
United States88 and the United Kingdom89—between 1991 and 2003
87 See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution
687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
724, 727–28 (1998) (maintaining that such a practice is consistent with
international law); Yoo, supra note 36, at 571–74 (discussing the justifications
under international law for the use of force in Iraq). Contra Franck, What Happens
Now?, supra note 1, at 612–14 (arguing that international law does not provide
justification for the U.S. and U.K. actions in Iraq); Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner,
Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and
the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 150–52 (1999) (finding a lack of
justification for the actions of the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq, and
pointing to the Security Council’s rebuffs of those efforts); Stromseth, supra note 5,
at 629–31 (discussing disagreements in the international community about the use
of force in Iraq both in the 1990s and in 2003).
88 See Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 611–12 (1970) (citing
William H. Taft, Remarks Before National Association of Attorneys General (Mar.
20, 2003)) (discussing the Department of State’s position on the presidential
invocation of self-defense to justify the use of force); see also Letter from the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America, Address to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003):

It has been long recognized and understood that a material breach of
these obligations removes the basis of the ceasefire and revives the
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to “revive” the authorization to use force contained in Resolution
678 (1991) have convinced other States that future authorizations
should be made more carefully. Their hesitance also stems from
the overly generous and unlimited authorizations issued by an
overactive Security Council in the immediate aftermath of the Cold
War.
These abusive justifications, based on past authorizations, have
ignited a vicious circle, which, in turn, has paved the way for a
greater disentanglement of the collective security system. Indeed,
having witnessed abusive uses of its authorizations, the Council
and its members have grown disinclined to authorize force. As a
result, States, confronted with a (self-inflicted) recurrent dismissal
of their bellicose plans by the Security Council, have been prodded
to take advantage of extinct authorizations already granted by the
Security Council.
Simultaneously, these States have been
emboldened to make abusive interpretations of the other exception
under which the use of force is admitted, i.e. self-defense.
3.2.2.

Expanding Self-Defense

It is mostly through a perversion of the self-defense limitation90
that States have undermined the prohibition on the use of force.
authority to use force under resolution 678 (1990). This has been the basis
for coalition use of force in the past and has been accepted by the
Council, as evidenced, for example, by the Secretary-General’s public
announcement in January 1993 following Iraq’s material breach of
resolution 687 (1991) that coalition forces had received a mandate from
the Council to use force according to resolution 678 (1990).
Id.; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 427 (2003) (detailing Iraq’s failure to
comply with disarmament resolutions); Yoo, supra note 36, at 570 (“Thus, because
Iraq refused to fully comply with Resolution 687, such as by destroying fully its
[weapons of mass destruction] and their delivery systems, it was in ‘serious
violation’ of the cease-fire and the United States was justified in resuming use of
force under Resolution 678.”).
89 See Lord Goldsmith, Address to Parliamentary Question, Attorney General
Clarifies Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (18 March 2008) available at
http://fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2003/03/fco_not_180303_legaladvice
(referencing the Attorney General of the U.K.’s position on the use of force in
Iraq); see also UK Materials on International Law, 64 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L., 736–40
(1993).
90 As was explained supra note 66, the I.C.J. abandoned its classical
qualification of self-defense as an “exception” to the prohibition on the use of
force in favor of regarding it as a “limitation.” See generally Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) (discussing the court’s self-defense jurisprudence);
d’Argent, supra note 66 (highlighting this transition).
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Indeed, contemporary practice—especially practice pertaining to
the fight against “terrorism”91—has caused far-ranging and
sweeping abuses of the concept of self-defense as it is enshrined in
Article 51 of the Charter. The perversion of the self-defense
limitation has manifested itself in various ways. It has impinged
on the notion of armed attack, the requirement that the aggression
or the threat of aggression originates from a State and the
requirement of a prior aggression. A few words must be said
about each of these emerging loopholes in the right of self-defense
since they reflect a general widening of the limitation of the
concept and, thus, an acceleration of the collective security
system’s disintegration.
3.2.2.1.

The Threshold of Violence Required for an Armed
Attack

The definition of what constitutes an armed attack has long
fueled controversy. As is well-known, this debate has been partly
kindled by the discrepancies existing between the English and
French versions of the U.N. Charter.92 The definition provided by
the General Assembly’s Resolution 3314 (XXIX)93 has not fully
alleviated this concern—some authors even went as far as claiming
that it consciously codifies all the judicial “loopholes and pretexts”
to unleash aggression.94 While there is probably no controversy in
cases of all-out invasion by regular armed forces of one State into
the territory of another State, it remains uncertain whether an
attack by precise modern airborne weapons or a series of low-scale
attacks constitute armed attacks giving rise to the right to use force

91 See The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (explaining
that terrorism is understood as an activity “intended to cause death or serious
bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a
population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or
abstain from doing any act”).
92 Charte des Nations Unies [U.N. Charter] art. 51 (suggesting a higher
threshold of violence for an “agression armée”).
93 See Bengt Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154 RECUEIL DES COURS 299,
307–12 (1977) (providing a historical account of the elaboration of the definition of
aggression).
94 Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM.
J. INT’L L. 224, 239 (1977) (arguing that states which joined in the consensus
showed ample awareness of persisting conflicts).
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in self-defense. In recent years, the question of whether a cyberattack can be considered an armed attack has also been debated.95
Mindful of the risk inherent in a loose understanding of the
concept of armed attack, the position of the I.C.J. has been twofold.
On the one hand, the court has always carefully avoided the most
controversial of the abovementioned difficulties. In the Oil
Platforms case, for instance, the I.C.J. was confronted with the
question of whether a series of minor attacks cumulatively
amounted to an armed attack96—an argument, often called the
accumulation doctrine, that has long been advocated by some
States97—but failed to provide an answer.98 On the other hand, in
the context of a foreign State’s support of insurgents, the court has
provided a very restrictive interpretation of how the concept of
armed attack must be understood. In its 1998 decision, Military and
Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, for example, the court referred
to the definition of “aggression” enshrined in the abovementioned
resolution 3314 of the General Assembly and argued that it
required a very high level of State involvement in an attack by
irregular forces.99 In the Oil Platforms case, the court, by referring
to the reference made by the court in the Nicaragua case to the
gravity of the attack in the context of collective self-defense,100
required the attack by regular forces to be of a certain gravity to
amount to an armed attack triggering the right to self-defense.101
95 See Mark Landler & John Markoff, In Estonia, What May Be the First War in
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/05/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-cyberwar.4.5901141.html (discussing “the
first war in cyberspace”).
96 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 190–91 (Nov. 6) (“[T]he burden
of proof of the existence of an armed attack by Iran on the United States, in the
form of a missile attack on the Sea Isle City, has not been discharged.”).
97 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 230–31
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (explaining the accumulation doctrine advanced by
Israel).
98 See Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 331–32 (separate opinion of Judge Simma)
(noting that the majority opinion did not address the issue of cumulative attacks
which do not individually constitute armed attacks).
99 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103–
04 (June 27) (“There is no rule in customary international law permitting another
State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own
assessment of the situation”); see also id. at 341–47 (Schwebel, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the narrow understanding of aggression adopted by the court).
100 Id. at 103.
101 Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 186–91 (stating that an exercise of self-defense
requires verification that a state was responsible for the attack, and that the attack
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This very strict understanding of what constitutes an armed attack
was challenged by Uganda in its pleading in Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo but the court did not yield.102
The
103
It was,
conservatism of the court has been widely criticized.
however, followed by other international judges, including the
Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Award in Ethiopia’s Ius ad
Bellum Claims 1-8,104 as well as the Institut de Droit international.105
The conservatism of the court has probably not been useless. It
seems that in practice States still believe that self-defense can only
be used as long as the original attack is of sufficient gravity.
Gravity can nonetheless be understood in various ways as it can
stem from either the scale of the attack or its effects; the I.C.J. itself
resorted to both yardsticks in the Nicaragua case.106 This means
that a lot of uncertainty remains as to how the gravity of the attack
must be appraised. Be that as it may, it is regrettable that the Court
has not seized upon the opportunity to resolve the controversies
pertaining to a series of low-intensity attacks or the use of specific
fits into the definition of “armed attack” as specified in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter).
102 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, paras. 146–47 (Dec. 19) (holding that Uganda had no
right to self-defense); see also Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. paras. 4–15 (separate
opinion of Judge Simma) (suggesting that the narrow interpretation needs to be
reevaluated); Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. paras. 16–31 (separate opinion of Judge
Kooijmans) (criticizing the court for not seizing upon the opportunity to clarify
that point).
103 See generally Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on the I.C.J.’s Procedural
and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 116 (1987) (arguing that recent I.C.J.
decisions resulted in substantive and procedural disadvantages in dispute
resolution).
104 See Eth. v. Eri., Partial Award, 45 I.L.M. 430 (2006) (exhibiting a strict
understanding of what an armed attack constitutes). See generally Pierre d’Argent
& Jean d’Aspremont, La Commission des réclamations Erythrée—Ethiopie: un premier
bilan, 53 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 347 (2007) (supporting this
stance further).
105 See Institut de Droit international, Substitution and Equivalence in Private
International Law, Res. 10A, art. 5 (Oct. 27, 2007) (“To an act requiring the
intervention of an authority such as a judge, notary, or registrar, an equivalent act
by the authority of another State is substituted if the respective authorities
exercise the same or similar functions.”); Institut de Droit international, Present
Problems of the Use of Armed Force in International Law, Res. 10A, para. 5 (Oct.
27, 2007) (“An armed attack triggering the right of self-defence must be of a
certain degree of gravity.”).
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para.
195 (June 27).
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weapons, because these ambiguities could pave the way for large
abuses of the concept of self-defense. It must be acknowledged
that these debates have remained limited in scope. The expansion
of self-defense to situations involving attacks by non-State actors—
while corresponding to a contemporary need—has been much
more instrumental in the enfeeblement of the collective security
system and therefore will be briefly addressed.
3.2.2.2.

Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors

It is probably the threats posed by non-State actors—those that
are seen as belonging to terrorist organizations or secessionist
movements—at the global, regional, or local level that have
prodded States to incrementally feel less constrained by the legal
requirements of the self-defense exception. This is not entirely
surprising. In the absence of an authorization by the Security
Council, the current collective security system does not provide an
explicit right to use force in the case of an armed attack by nonState actors,107 unless it can be attributed to a State—for instance,
because it has been committed under the effective control of
another State108—or simply because it follows “[t]he sending by or
on behalf of [another] State of armed hands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force . . . of such
gravity as to amount to [an act of aggression].”109 As a result,
States, confronted with the rising threats from non-State actors,
have tried to justify the use of armed force on the basis of self107 On the desire of some states during the negotiations on the U.N. General
Assembly Definition of Aggression to construe mere support, assistance or
encouragement to armed bands abroad as aggression, see Stone, supra note 94, at
238 (describing how states such as Indonesia and Guyana wanted to expand the
range of activities constituting aggression).
108 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. para. 115 (“United States
participation . . . in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping
of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning
of the whole of its operation, [was] still insufficient in itself . . . for the purpose of
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of
their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua”); Armed Activities, 2005
I.C.J. para. 160 (concluding “the MLC was not that of ‘an organ’ of Uganda”);
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, para. 396 (Feb. 26)
(determining whether the massacres at Srebrenica were committed by persons
under control of the state).
109 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
See also CORTEN, supra note 50, at 672 (discussing the use of force in contemporary
international law).
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defense even if the armed attack cannot be attributed to a State but
only to a terrorist organization. It is particularly noteworthy that,
while unilateral uses of force against non-state actors in the 1980s
were systematically condemned,110 this is no longer the case.
Attention now focuses not on the question of whether the use of
force is permitted, but instead on whether the use of force is
proportionate.111 This is well-illustrated by the war in Afghanistan
in 2001112 and the war in Lebanon in 2006.113 Overall, claims that
force can be used as a measure of self-defense are no longer the
exception and are closer to becoming the rule.114
If the concept of armed attack is understood as being
necessarily committed by a State, one can liken the rule of selfdefense to a rule that only yields its legal effects if the behavior that
it regulates can be ascribed to a person endowed with an official
status.115 This means that self-defense is a rule whereby the
impugned conduct,116 or the fact which triggers the legal effects
defined by the rule, must be the act of an actor or an entity which
110 See S.C. Res. 573, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (condemning
the 1985 raid by Israel on the PLO Headquarters outside Tunis); G.A. Res. 41/38,
para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986) (condemning the raid of the
United States against Libya).
111 Tams, supra note 86, at 379.
112 See generally GREGOR WETTBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY OF SELFDEFENSE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS: STATE PRACTICE FROM THE U.N. CHARTER TO
THE PRESENT 152–63 (2007) (discussing the conflict in Afghanistan). See also
Raphaël van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors in
the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 183, 206–08
(2010) (discussing the application of the self-defense limitation to the Afghanistan
conflict).
113 See generally Andreas Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad
bellum, jus in bello and the Issue of Proportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 99
(2007) (discussing the Second Lebanon War in relation to the use of force under
international law and to international humanitarian law).
114 Cf. Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 608 (explaining that, while
in the 1970s states tried to justify use of force with self-defense, today states rarely
put much effort into a self-defense justification).
115 Note, for instance, the obligations pertaining to the right to life, which
requires that a state agent commit an infringement of the right to life. See generally
SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 155 (2nd ed., 2004) (arguing that the
state must control and limit circumstances in which individuals may be deprived
of life by the state).
116 On the discussion of whether self-defense enshrines a right or a
prohibition, see Kammerhofer, supra note 14, at 229 (discussing the use of force
within Kelsen’s theoretical framework).
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has the official status of a State. It cannot be ascertained whether
this was the original meaning of the concept of armed attack when
it was first set out in the U.N. Charter. Indeed, the question of
what constitutes an armed attack was not really deemed important
during the negotiations of the Charter, as Article 51 was originally
devised to ensure compatibility between regional self-defense
pacts and the U.N. collective security system.117 At that time,
violence in the international arena was still mostly construed in a
classical inter-State format. Even if we believe that the concept of
self-defense was originally restricted to situations of armed attacks
by States, it is still conceivable that the rule has evolved to waive
the requirement pertaining to the official status of the original
attacker and now encapsulates situations of attack by non-State
actors.
Since there is no clear answer in the Charter, one might have
expected the I.C.J., in its role as “principal judicial organ” of the
U.N.,118 to alleviate this pressing need for clarification. Such a
move would, after all, be in line with its previous crucial
contributions to the clarification of the U.N. system.119 Overall, the
I.C.J. in its Nicaragua,120 Wall,121 and Armed Activities122 decisions
promoted a very orthodox understanding of the classical rule of
self-defense and has tended to shy away from clearly affirming a
right to resort to self-defense in cases of armed attack by non-State
actors. In the Nicaragua and Armed Activities cases, the court did
not expressly rule out the application of self-defense in cases of
armed attack by non-State actors, for it was not necessary to
117 Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: Anticipation, Preemption, Prevention, and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN, 113, 116–17,
121 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
118 U.N. Charter art. 92.
119 One of the most crucial clarifications to the U.N. system was formulated
by the I.C.J.. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 65 (June 21) (determining
that since South Africa’s mandate in South West Africa was terminated, its
presence there was illegal).
120 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para.
195 (June 27).
121 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 139 (July 9).
122 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 148 (Dec. 19).
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envisage self-defense from that angle.123 Its advisory opinion in
Wall is more intricate in this respect. Although the court did not
expressly say that the right to self-defense exists only in the case of
an armed attack by one State against another,124 the decision can
reasonably be interpreted as an implicit rejection of the right to use
force against the territory of another State (or quasi-State entity) in
response to acts of non-State actors emanating from the territory
but not attributable to that (quasi-)State entity. The separate
opinions of the judges joined to the advisory opinion seem to
confirm this interpretation.125 The implicit rejection126 of the
application of self-defense in cases of attacks of great gravity by
non-State actors has been significantly criticized by scholars for
being overly conservative and oblivious to contemporary
realities.127
It is beyond doubt that the court is well aware of the current
controversies riddling the concept of self-defense and the
ambiguity of its decisions is not a pure fortuity. Although the
court’s decisions are predominantly conservative, the uncertainty
shrouding the pronouncements prevent us from inferring firm

123 See Kimberley Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right
of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 141, 144
(2007) (“As in Nicaragua, the court did not explicitly rule out that a lesser degree of
State involvement (such as acquiescence) could form the basis for attributing the
armed activities of irregular forces to the State”).
124 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. para. 139.
125 This seems to be confirmed by the separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2005 I.C.J. para. 35, as well as by the
separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall, 2005 I.C.J. para. 6.
126 For an interpretation of the decision as not excluding self-defense in case
of attacks by non-state actors, see Iris Canor, When Jus ad Bellum meets Jus in
Bello: The Occupier’s Right of Self-Defence Against Terrorism Stemming from Occupied
Territories, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 129, 132 (2006) (arguing that, although the I.C.J.
gives “thin treatment” to self-defense, the concept is related to the legal
personality of the state and state responsibility and effective control).
127 See Christian Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of SelfDefence in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963 (2005) for the argument that in
interpreting self-defense that way, it would become a “vehicle that hardly ever
leaves the garage.” He borrows this expression from Ian Brownlie, Comment, in
CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW–MAKING 110 (Joseph H. H. Weiler
& Antonio Cassese eds., 1988) (referring to jus cogens); see also Sean D. Murphy,
Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the I.C.J.?, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (2005) (criticizing the I.C.J.’s “institutional capabilities” to
adjudicate cases of armed conflict).
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conclusions regarding the application of the concept of selfdefense, particularly since the court did not entirely rule out the
application of self-defense in the case of an armed attack by nonState actors.
So long as the Charter and the court’s case law do not clearly
exclude the application of self-defense in cases of attack by nonState actors and seemingly leaves room for further development of
the rule, the conceptual routes by which the concept of self-defense
can accommodate the contemporary State practice of armed force
used against non-State entities remains unclear.
Recent
scholarship seems to have envisaged the extension of self-defense
to situations of attack by non-State actors in two different ways.
First, some authors have suggested that the rules of attribution
ought to be either different or loosely interpreted in cases of attack
by non-State actors (special rules of attribution). Second, some
authors have argued that the concept of armed attack no longer
requires that the attack be attributed to any State. Those defending
the latter option have either discarded any requirement of state
involvement (privatization of the concept of armed attack) or have
posited that the original attack, although not attributable to a State,
still requires some State involvement (indirect attack). These
different conceptual options deserve some attention.
3.2.2.2.1.

Special Rules of Attribution

This is the idea—already articulated in Judge Jennings’
dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case128—that there exists a
radically different, special rule (lex specialis) of conduct attribution
that departs from the traditional rules of attribution enshrined in
the Articles of the International Law Commission on State
Responsibility in cases of armed attacks by terrorist groups.129 The

128 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 533
(June 27), Jennings, J., dissenting.
129 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51 arts. 4–11 (defining state
acts). This has barely been discussed in the international legal scholarship. But see
André Nollkaemper, Attribution of Forcible Acts to States: Connections between the
Law on the Use of Force and the Law of State Responsibility, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND THE USE OF FORCE 133, 162 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005)
(“Responsibility of a state based on knowledge, foreseeability, intent, and
causation may come close to attribution for purposes of state responsibility.”). See
also Raphaël van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors
in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, supra note 112 at 194–97
(discussing “state attribution rules”).
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possibility of special rules of attribution that depart from the
general rules laid out by the ILC has also been recognized by the
I.C.J. itself in the Genocide case; though the Court required that
these rules be “clearly expressed.”130 Adapting the rules of
attribution to cases of armed attacks by terrorists groups could also
take the form, not of a lex specialis, but of a very flexible and loose
interpretation of the principles of attribution enshrined in Articles
4–11 of the Articles on State Responsibility.131
It is important to note that adapting the rules of attribution to
some special hypotheses—whether through new special rules or ad
hoc interpretation—dovetails with a classical “inter-state”
interpretation of the concept of armed attack, and more generally
an inter-state reading of ius ad bellum.132 It is also a conceptual
construction that preserves the fulfillments of the other conditions
of the exercise of self-defense, and especially the condition of
necessity.
Indeed, in the mainstream interpretation of the
conditions for the exercise of self-defense, the condition of
necessity includes a requirement of state involvement.133 This
means that the involvement of a state is required to ensure that the
military response fulfills the condition of necessity. In other
words, if the defensive attack is directed at a state, the original
attack must have been committed by a state due to strict necessity.
In light of this requirement, it is only if the armed attack by nonState actors can be formally attributed to a state that the condition
130 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, para. 401 (Feb.
26) (“The rules for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a State
do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in question in the absence of a
clearly expressed lex specialis.”).
131 See, e.g., Tams, supra note 86, at 385–87 (discussing the various ways to
construct attribution and state responsibility); see also Nollkaemper, supra note
129, at 156–157 (discussing the attribution of acts of force to the state).
132 This is also the opinion of Tams, supra note 86, at 369.
133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 97, at 209–10 (discussing that the predicate
requirements for self-defense include necessity, proportionality, and immediacy);
Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as ‘Armed Attack’: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51
(1/2) of the UN Charter and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35,
42, 47–48 (2003) (evaluating when a state can use self-defense against terrorist
aggression); Trapp, supra note 123, at 145–46 (“decisions [of the International
Court] should be understood as requiring that armed attacks be attributable to a
State if the State itself is to be the subject of defensive uses of force.”) (emphasis in
original); see also Raphaël van Steenberghe, supra note 112, at 199 (discussing the
use of force against private armed attacks).
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of necessity can be fulfilled. However, it should be noted that
while severing the concept of armed attack from attribution to a
state may help extend situations of armed attack to violence by
irregular forces, it would nonetheless prove of little value with
respect to the requirement of necessity.
While the adaptation of the rules of attribution may seem more
attuned to the inter-state character of the international legal order
and the condition of necessity, it may be more problematic as a
matter of policy and pragmatism. As has been argued by
Milanovic, there is a strong policy argument in favor of an
amendment of the primary rules pertaining to the use of force
instead of the secondary rules of attribution.134 According to that
view, contemporary problems are better dealt with if primary rules
are changed without affecting the general systemic rules. This
Article does not intend to address this debate. The following
paragraphs simply present the two manners in which the primary
rules pertaining to the use of force, rather than the secondary rules
of attribution, can be modified to accommodate a use of force
against non-State actors without affecting the secondary rules of
attribution.
3.2.2.2.2.

Privatization of the Concept of Armed Attack

Although the conditions for the exercise of self-defense seem to
require that the armed attack be committed by a state entity, some
authors have defended another conceptual construction to justify
the extension of self-defense to situations of armed attack by nonstate entities. According to them, the concept of armed attack does
not require the attack to emanate from a state; instead, the
determination of what constitutes an armed attack is strictly a
question of the intensity of the attack.135 Such an interpretation—
134 See Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Acts of Non-state Actors: A
Comment on Griebel and Plücken, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 307, 323 (2009) (discussing the
adoption of permanent rules).
135 See Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Response to Terrorism, in 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
ROBERT AGO, 139, 146 (P. L. Zanardi et al eds., 1987) (explaining that even if a state
is too weak to evict terrorists from its borders, the victim state need not sit by and
allow the attacks solely out of respect for a sovereign’s borders); DINSTEIN, supra
note 97, at 206–08; Daniel Janse, International Terrorism and Self-Defence, 36 ISRAEL
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 149, 170–71 (2006) (arguing that the self-defense justification could
seemingly be used against a state supporting terrorists); Murphy, supra note 127,
at 63 (discussing the scope of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter); Sean D. Murphy,
Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43
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which completely privatizes the concept of armed attack—has also
been echoed in some I.C.J. Judges’ opinions.136 It is not impossible
that an additional underpinning for this construction may be
found in the position advocated by the Court in the Oil Platforms
case where the Court severed the question of attribution of the
attack to a state from the determination of the armed attack itself.137
Should the concept of armed attack be entirely stripped of its
inter-state features, this re-reading of Article 51 would probably go
hand-in-hand with an acceptance of the so-called ‘accumulation
doctrine’ whereby a string of small-scale attacks by non-state actors
amount to an armed attack falling under Article 51. The I.C.J. has
shown that it is not ready to accept this concept.138 It is uncertain
whether this would still be its position if the idea of a private
armed attack were to be widely accepted.
3.2.2.2.3.

Indirect Attack

Among those who have advocated a concept of armed attack
stripped of any requirement of attribution to the state, some have
nonetheless continued to require a certain level of state
involvement in the original attack committed by non-state actors.
HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 45 (2002) (explaining the scale of activities that might rise to
the level of an armed attack); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the
Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7,
16–18 (2003) (discussing the use of anticipatory self-defense in the context of
threats from terrorists after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
136 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 35 (July 9) (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 11 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion
of Judge Simma).
137 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 51 (Nov. 6). Therefore, in
order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in
exercise of the right of individual self-defense, the United States had to show that
attacks had been made upon it for which Iran was responsible; and that those
attacks were of such a nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” within the
meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and as understood in
customary law on the use of force. For an understanding of this decision as
allowing an application of self-defense even if the armed attack is not attributable
to a State, see Trapp, supra note 123, at 156 (“In the meantime, State practice
strongly suggests that the international community has recognized a right to use
force in self-defence targeting non-State actors in foreign territory to the extent
that the foreign State cannot be relied on to prevent or suppress terrorist
activities.”).
138 Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. paras. 62–64.
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Such state involvement, although of a lesser degree than that
leading to attribution of the act or the state, could amount to
toleration, acquiescence, logistical support, or assistance to the
non-state entities carrying out the attack.139 This means that the
armed attack is carried out by a non-state entity that was tolerated,
harbored or supported by the state against which the defensive
attack will subsequently be carried out. This mild privatization of
the concept of armed attack seems sufficient to live up to the
condition of exercise of self-defense pertaining to necessity. The
extension of self-defense to situations of indirect attacks—namely
cases of harboring terrorists or supporting them—has received an
implied espousal in the 2005 African Union Non-Aggression and
Common Defence Pact.140
The exact conceptual foundation of the extension of the concept
of self-defense to situations of armed attacks by non-state actors is
still a matter of much debate. Whether one amends or loosens the
classical rules on attribution or whether one uses a strict severance
between attribution to a state and the concept of armed attack so as
to require no state involvement at all or only a limited state
connection, the legal scholarship seems to be moving towards an
acceptance of self-defense even if the armed attack cannot be

139 See Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden,
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 565–67 (1999) (discussing the involvement of Afghanistan
and Sudan in providing “safe havens” for terrorist groups); Tom Ruys & Sten
Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence, 10 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 289, 312 (2005) (arguing that the need for state involvement in private
attacks is supported by both legal scholarship and state practice).
140 Art. 1(c)(xi) states:

The following shall constitute acts of aggression, regardless of a
declaration of war by a State, group of States, organization of States, or
non-State actor(s) or by any foreign entity: . . . the encouragement,
support, harbouring or provision of any assistance for the commission of
terrorist acts and other violent trans-national organized crimes against a
Member State.
African Union, Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact art. 1(c)(xi), Jan. 31,
2005, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/text/Non%
20Aggression%20Common%20Defence%20Pact.pdf. On the relationship between
the African Union Defence Pact and the U.N. Charter, see van Steenberghe, supra
note 52, at 125. On the specificities of the African Union Non-Aggression and
Common Defense Pact, see Marco Roscini, Neighbourhood Watch? The African Great
Lakes Pact and ius ad bellum, 69 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 931 (2009).
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attributed to the state against which the defensive action is carried
out.141
3.2.2.3.

Pre-Emptive Self-Defense

Another manifestation of the expansion of self-defense is the
growing adoption among states of the concept of pre-emptive selfdefense. While clearly prohibited by the U.N. Charter,142 preemptive self-defense—in the case of an imminent threat of an
armed attack143—has been gradually accepted by states. The High
Level Panel has also endorsed it, though in somewhat ambiguous
terms.144 In addition, the Secretary-General espoused the idea that
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter covers imminent threats.145 Such a
position is also defended by the Institut de Droit International.146

141 This is also the opinion expressed in GRAY, supra note 75, at 130. See the
ambiguous resolution of paragraph 10 of the Institut de Droit International’s
October 27, 2007 resolution, which recognizes the application of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter to this situation but seems to restrict it to very limited and classical
situations. Problèmes actuels du recours à la force en droit international, Institut
de Droit International, Res. 10A, para. 10 (Oct. 27, 2007).
142 See CORTEN, supra note 50, at 619 (discussing the requirement in Article 51
of the U.N. Charter that self-defense measures be preceded by an armed attack,
such that pre-emptive self-defense is prohibited); Theodore Christakis, Vers une
Reconnaissance de la Notion de Guerre Préventive?, in L’INTERVENTION EN IRAK ET LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 19 (Karrine Bannelier et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that Article
51 of the U.N. Charter prohibits pre-emptive self-defense in its requirement of an
armed attack).
143 On preemptive self-defense, see generally W. Michael Reisman & Andrea
Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 525 (2006) (discussing the development of the use of pre-emptive selfdefense, where States react to the possibility of a future attack); Sean D. Murphy,
The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005) (discussing the
notion of pre-emptive self-defense in terms of international legal norms and legal
theory); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 227 (2003) (evaluating the potential expansion of the legal definition of
“armed attack” to include threats that prompt pre-emptive self-defense).
144 U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES
AND CHANGES, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY paras. 188–92,
U.N. Doc. A/59/565, U.N. Sales. No. E.05.I.5 (2004).
145 The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, paras. 122–25, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
146 See Resolution of the Institut de Droit international Res. 10A, supra note
141, para. 3 (“The right of self-defence arises for the target State in case of an
actual or manifestly imminent armed attack.”).
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It is important to highlight that this dismissal of the
requirement that an armed attack has actually occurred does not
go so far as permitting preventive self-defense, i.e. short of the
imminent threat of an armed attack.147 Only a few states support
the legality of preventive self-defense without even claiming that
such an interpretation would constitute lex lata.148
In any case, whether self-defense can be pre-emptive or even
preventive, resorting to the conditions of exercise laid out in the
famous Caroline incident149—which are frequent both in practice150
and in the literature151—is hardly relevant. The Caroline incident
cannot serve as a precedent for any of the contemporary
developments, at least as long as the collective security system still
rests on a prohibition on the use of force. The Caroline incident
dates back to a time when the use of force was not prohibited. It is,
147 See
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS,
CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, supra note 144, paras. 189–92 (clarifying that it is
illegal for a State to use force in response to a non-imminent threat absent Security
Council authorization). For comments from U.N. member states on the use of
force, see the April 6–8, 2005 General Assembly debates. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.85 (Apr. 6, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
86th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.86 (Apr. 6, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
87th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.87 (Apr. 7, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.88 (Apr. 7, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
89th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.89 (Apr. 8, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
90th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.90 (Apr. 8, 2005). See also Institut de Droit
International Res. 10A, supra note 141, para. 6 (“There is no basis in international
law for the doctrine[] of ‘preventive’ self-defence . . .”).
148 See Press Release from The White House, supra note 44 (stating the United
States’ policy of taking action against emerging threats to its national security);
Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 619 (discussing the United States’
National Security Strategy and suggesting that it appears to “be exponentially
expanding . . . the range of permissible preemption.”). On the ambiguous
position of Australia, see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Pre-emptive Self-Defence: A
Necessary Development or the Road to International Anarchy?, 23 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L.
51 (2004) (referring to statements by members of the Australian government
proposing that the international community redefine the right of self-defense).
See also Nicole Abadee & Donald R. Rothwell, The Howard Doctrine: Australia and
Anticipatory Self-Defense against Terrorist Attacks, 26 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 19 (2007).
149 For a review of the Caroline incident, see R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938) (discussing the Caroline case and its
significance in the early development of legal limits to the right of self-defense).
150 See William H. Taft, The Legal Basis for Preemption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, Nov. 18, 2002, http://www.cfr.org/publication/5250/legal_basis_for
_preemption.html (discussing the Caroline “necessity” justification as it applies to
the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction).
151 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 36, at 572 (discussing the requirements of
anticipatory self-defense as formulated in Caroline).
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therefore, of no avail to invoke the practice of an era where the use
of force was not prohibited152 in order to determine the ambit of a
limitation to the prohibition to use force in the contemporary
system.153
3.3. Intervention by Invitation: Consent by Governments Lacking
“Effectivité”
Despite the stance defended by the Institut de Droit International
opposing all interventions of third party states in civil war,154 it is
well-known that the I.C.J. has confirmed in the case of the Military
and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua that a state can call upon
another state to assist it and consent to the use of force by the latter
on its territory.155 The possibility of inviting another state to use
force on one’s own territory—which is often done in practice156—
was again confirmed in the Armed Activities case.157 This is not,
strictly speaking, a limitation to the prohibition on the use of force
in the same vein as self-defense, for the prohibition on the use of
force only prohibits the use of force without consent.158 Indeed,
152 On the existence of the prohibition to use force to the U.N. Charter, see
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 530 (June 27)
(Jennings, J., dissenting) (“There is no doubt that there was, prior to the United
Nations Charter, a customary law which restricted the lawful use of force, and
which correspondingly provided also for a right to use force in self-defence.”).
153 See Tarcisio Gazzini, A Response to Amos Guiora: Pre-Emptive Self-Defence
Against Non-State Actors?, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 25, 25–26 (2008) (arguing that
the Caroline incident should today be better treated under the “rubric of state
necessity”).
154 The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, Institut de Droit
international
Res.
(Aug.
14,
1975),
available
at
http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf
155 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. para. 246.
156 On the recent practice concerning the Saudi military intervention in
Yemen in November 2009, see Robert F. Worth, Yemeni Rebels and Saudis Clash at
Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at A8 (reporting on Saudi Arabia’s involvement
in the Yemeni government’s conflict with the rebels); Robert F. Worth, Saudis
Claim to Beat Back Yemeni Rebels in Border Area, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at A7
(describing the intervention as Saudi Arabia’s first “unilateral” military campaign
in decades); Robert F. Worth, Yemen Rebels Routed, Saudi Arabia Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2009, at A14 (discussing Saudi military action against Yemeni rebels).
157 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, paras. 42–54 & 92–105 (Dec. 19).
158 Strangely enough, the International Law Commission has construed
consent as a “circumstance precluding wrongfulness.”
Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 20.
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once the host state consents, the use of force is not at odds with the
territorial integrity of the host State and accordingly does not
infringe Article 2(4) of the Charter.
While this rule has not, at least as far as its principle is
concerned, been subject to much controversy,159 the determination
of the conditions upon which a government can issue such an
invitation has allowed an enlargement of the consent-based
justifications for the use of force. Indeed, it has classically been
contended that only an effective government could validly consent
to the use of force by another State on its territory. The growing
importance of criteria for democratic legitimacy in international
law160 has, however, diluted the requirement of effectivité of the
government issuing the invitation. The democratic legitimacy of a
government has typically offset its poor effectivité.161 This indicates
that the effectivité of the government issuing the invitation no
longer constitutes the overarching condition of the validity of the
consent to the intervention of another state. This conclusion seems
implied by the I.C.J. in its decision in the Armed Activities case,
which never questioned whether the Congolese government was
effective enough to validly invite other States to use force on its
territory.162 The foregoing explains why democratic governments,
which do not wield an effective control over the territory of the
state, seem to be entitled to validly invite another state to forcefully
intervene. However, as illustrated by the American intervention in
Grenada163 and in Panama,164 democratic legitimacy can be subject
to manipulations and abusive interpretation; the possession of
159 See GRAY, supra note 75, at 81 (observing that the rule represents a
“generally agreed position” that “normally if one state requested assistance from
another, then clearly that intervention could not be dictatorial and therefore
unlawful.”).
160 See Jean d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 877, 913-16 (2006) (discussing the criteria for determining
the legitimacy of democratic governments and proposing a formulation that
addresses the case of the illiberal democracy).
161 Id.
162 Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. paras. 42–54 & 92–105.
163 See generally Crandall, supra note 77 (discussing the American intervention
in Grenada).
164 See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Protection of Nationals, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 200, 200 (1984)
(discussing U.S. rescue operations in Grenada); Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Refugees, 78 AM. J. INT’L L.
655, 661 (1984) (discussing the collective security action in Grenada).
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certain democratic trappings sometimes seems to suffice to endow
an ineffective government with the power to invite a foreign State
to intervene. In this way, easing the requirements for validly
consenting to the forceful intervention of another State further
waters down the general prohibition on the use of force and
weakens the collective security system.
3.4. Evading Responsibility by Using Force Out of Necessity
It is uncontested that, even though an action may constitute a
violation of international law, its author will not incur
responsibility if it can invoke any “circumstances precluding
wrongfulness,”165 especially if it can prove that it acted in a state of
necessity.166 This requires that the illegal conduct constituted the
“only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril” and did not “seriously impair an
essential interest of the state or states towards which the obligation
exists, or of the international community as a whole.”167 No one
disputes, however, that circumstances precluding wrongfulness
cannot be invoked to absolve a state that has committed a violation
of a peremptory norm of international law.168 This means that if
the prohibition on the use force were to be considered a
peremptory norm of international law, an illegal use of force
165 It is interesting—although hardly understandable—that self-defense has
been construed as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness by the International
Law Commission in the framework of its work on the Responsibility of States.
This seems to contradict the earlier position of the ILC, Addendum to the Eighth
Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5 (1980), reprinted in 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n. 51, §83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1, as well as
the understanding of the International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat of
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 38. The
commentary to Article 21 is itself beset by ambiguity. See CRAWFORD, supra note
81, at 166–67 (qualifying the legality of self-defense by stating that a State is
“‘totally restrained’ by an international obligation if that obligation is expressly or
intended to apply as a definitive constraint,” and also noting that “Article 21
leaves open all issues of the effect of action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.”).
166 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 25. On the status of
article 25, see the remarks of Sarah Heathcote, Circumstances Precluding
Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility—Necessity, in THE LAW OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, (J. Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (forthcoming) (on file with the
author). See also S. Heathcote, Est-ce que l’état de nécessité est un principe de droit
international coutumier?, 40 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 53 (2007).
167 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 25.
168 Id. art. 26.
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would always engage the responsibility of its author. On the
contrary, if the ius cogens character of the norm lies solely with the
prohibition of aggression, states using force beneath the threshold
of aggression can evade responsibility by invoking a state of
necessity.
It must be acknowledged that this debate is rarely echoed in
practice or in the discourse of states and has mostly been confined
to academic circles. This should not cause any surprise. As has
been stated, the main implications of this debate do not pertain to
the legality of the impugned behavior but to its consequences in
terms of responsibility to which states are less amenable. It is
nonetheless interesting to note that the I.C.J. deemed it important
to examine the invocation of the state of necessity in its advisory
opinion on the Wall Opinion. It is of particular interest to note that
the court examined the application of the state of necessity without
preliminarily raising the question of the general applicability of
such a rule in cases of violations that could include infringements of
the prohibition on the use of force.169 The court remained
ambiguous and it cannot be firmly asserted that the court
presupposed that the state of necessity could be invoked to deprive
low-intensity illegal uses of force of their wrongful character.
For the sake of this study, there is no need to dwell upon that
controversy and it suffices to note that, as some authors have
argued,170 the Charter itself seems to prohibit the invocation of the
state of necessity to evade responsibility for breaches of the
Charter. Although the U.N. Charter does not deal with issues of
responsibility and is only concerned with questions of legality, it
can reasonably be defended that the primary norms enshrined in
the Charter have excluded the use of the secondary norm of
necessity. In particular, by virtue of the concept of self-defense, the
Charter seems to have intended to provide a self-contained regime
as to how circumstances arising out of necessity could be used to
evade compliance with the prohibition on the use force.

169 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 140 (July 9).
170 See, e.g., CORTEN, supra note 50, at 327 (arguing that the U.N. Charter does
not provide for the invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness,
including a state of necessity); see also Maria Agius, The Invocation of Necessity in
International Law, 56 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 95 (2009), at 111 (discussing the law of
necessity under the U.N. Charter).
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It must be acknowledged that this abovementioned restrictive
interpretation of the Charter remains contentious, and it cannot be
excluded that its silence on this matter, especially if conjugated
with the idea that only the prohibition of aggression is endowed
with ius cogens character, allows an interpretation of the concept of
“state of necessity” that can potentially provide a new avenue for
using force without bearing the consequences of responsibility.
Should that be the case, not incurring responsibility would
nonetheless continue to hinge on the respect for the strict
conditions of the state of necessity, which may prove difficult in
practice.171
4.

APPRAISING THE DILUTION OF THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF
FORCE

This Article has so far tried to shed some light on the attempts
by States to subvert the limitations on the prohibition on the use of
force. It has been argued here that this practice, although
indicating some alarming instances of abuse, does not yet amount
to a complete disappearance of the prohibition on the use of force.
However, the dilution of the prohibition that has been evidenced
by this practice may well usher in an era where force will no longer
be prohibited. As has been stated, it is not that states are shedding
the prohibition. It is, rather, that the prohibition is being diluted
by the floating of new limitations and the expansion of the existing
ones.
As a result, we are left with a prohibition that is subject to
numerous ill-defined qualifications that make it very difficult to
delineate the exact command or restriction that it contains. Indeed,
the content of the rule has become extremely hazy since its scope
has grown very uncertain. The dilution of the prohibition on the
use of force is of such magnitude that the rule is almost nonnormative. By non-normative, this Article means that the rule no
longer enshrines a clear command and barely lays down any
specific obligation. This is what I have called elsewhere a rule with
a soft instrumentum,172 or what others have called a rule with a soft
171 On the application of the conditions of the state of necessity to the use of
force, see Christakis, supra note 142, at 29–45 (discussing the stringent application
of the requirements for establishing a state of necessity).
172 See Jean d’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for
New Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1081 (2008) (“The softness of the
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formulation.173 In this sense, it can be argued that the prohibition on
the use of force is becoming qualified by so many limitations,
which are themselves unclear, that the rule itself is incrementally
reaching a state of softness. This does not mean that the
prohibition on the use of force no longer constitutes a legal rule
and has been demoted to a mere moral principle. Indeed, the
formulation of clear obligations is not a constitutive element of any
legal norm. Even if some scholars have argued to the contrary,174 it
is now commonly agreed that a legal act need not be normative to
be legal.175 A legal norm with a soft content also constitutes an
entirely valid legal rule, for the formulation of a clear command is
not a condition of its validity.176 There are strong indications that
instrumentum pertains to the choice made by the legal subjects of an instrument
which lies outside the realm of law.”). Baxter is probably the first author to have
interpreted soft law in this sense. See R.R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite
Variety,” 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 549, 549 (1980) (“[T]here are norms of various
degrees of cogency, persuasiveness, and consensus which are incorporated in
agreements between States but do not create enforceable rights and duties. They
may be described as ‘soft’ law”); see also Georges M. Abi-Saab, Eloge du “Droit
Assourdi”: Quelques Réflexions sur le Rôle de la Soft Law en Droit International
Contemporain, in NOUVEAUX ITINÉRAIRES EN DROIT: HOMAGE À FRANÇOIS RIGAUX 59,
61 (1993) (examining the critique that soft law, increases the uncertainty
associated with law by blurring the distinction between what is law and what is
not); Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48
INTL & COMP. L.Q. 901, 901 (1999) (outlining the basic tenets of soft law); Tadeusz
Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law,” 30 MCGILL L.J. 37,
39 (1984) (characterizing soft law as a collection of techniques designed to
“achieve the goals of collective action and limited constraint”); Hartmut
Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 500 (1999)
(differentiating among non-treaty agreements). More recently, see ALAN BOYLE &
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (Oxford Univ. Press
2007) (discussing contrast between rules and norms or principles). But see VAUGN
LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (rejecting the use of soft
law to refer to legal acts with a soft content).
173 BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 172, at 220.
174 Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 34, 48 (July 6) (separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (“An instrument in which a party is entitled to
determine the existence of its obligation is not a valid and enforceable legal
instrument of which a court of law can take cognizance. It is not a legal
instrument. It is a declaration of a political principle and purpose.”); see also
Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 116 (Mar. 21) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Lauterpacht) (distinguishing the case at hand from Certain Norwegian
Loans).
175 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d) May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that, in lodging a reservation, States can “modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”).
176 This is not in dispute, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
does not elevate the normative character of a conventional act into a condition of
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the prohibition on the use of force is gradually experiencing a
softening of its content, thereby bearing a closer resemblance to the
prohibition on the threats of a use of force, which has always
suffered from a clear lack of normativity.177
On one occasion, the I.C.J. has been called upon to grapple with
a rule that was deemed non-normative in this sense because it was
riddled with too large a limitation. In the North Sea Continental
Shelf case, the court assessed the customary character of the
equidistance principle enshrined in Article 6 of the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf. On this occasion, it asserted
that the norm at stake had first to “be of a fundamentally normcreating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis
of a general rule of law.”178 The court built on the idea that any
conventional rule must contain a directive for it to be able to
someday crystallize into a customary international rule. Taking
into account the profound indeterminacy of the concept of “special
circumstances,” which determines the qualification of the
equidistance principle, the court concluded that the principle of
equidistance enshrined in the 1958 Convention was nonnormative. Since the principle of equidistance did not provide for
a given behavior to be adopted by the parties, the court concluded
that it could not crystallize or generate a rule of customary
international law.179

its validity. See id. pt. V, § 1 (1969) (discussing the criteria for impeaching the
validity of treaties). It is surprising that those who had construed the formulation
of clear obligations as a constitutive element of any legal act have simultaneously
hinted at the idea that a legal act that is not normative is invalid. See Certain
Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 48 (emphasizing the element of good faith in
international law).
177 On the loose content of the prohibition of threats of force, see generally
Dino Kritsiotis, Close Encounters of a Sovereign Kind, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 299 (2009).
On the prohibition of the treaty of force, see generally F. Dubuisson et A.
Lagerwall, Que signifie encore l´interdiction de recourir a la menace de la force, in
L’INTERVENTION EN IRAK ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 83 (Bannelier et al. eds., 2004).
178 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
42 (Feb. 20).
179 Id. at 41-42, para. 72. For an analysis of this aspect of the case, see Jean
d’Aspremont, Les dispositions non normatives des actes juridiques conventionnels à la
lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice, BELGIAN REV. INT’L L.
496, 518 (2003). See also BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 172, at 220–21 (noting that
“some treaty provisions are soft in the sense that they impose no real obligations
on the parties”).
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Drawing on the expanding limitations on the prohibition on
the use of force, the command that it enshrines is being diluted,
thereby stripping the rule of its ability to voice a clear command to
states. This practice accordingly makes it a rule with a soft content
that recalls the indeterminacy of the rule of equidistance with
which the I.C.J. previously grappled.
As the recent
abovementioned case law of the court pertaining to the use of force
indicates, the court has never likened the prohibition on the use of
force to the indeterminate principle of equidistance and has
applied it as if the commands that it contains were of sufficient
clarity. In doing so, the court has probably tried to stem the
dilution of the rule and has entrusted itself with the role of
guardian. It is not clear, however, whether the prohibition to use
force would pass the test of normativity that was applied by the
court in the Continental Shelf case.
While this Article has argued that the dilution of the
prohibition on the use of force mostly amounts to a softening of its
content through a multiplication and expansion of the limitations
to that prohibition, it must be acknowledged that the lack of clear
guidance in relation to the rules has been interpreted differently in
the legal scholarship. Liberal scholars, like Thomas Franck,
understand this kind of softness as a dent in the legitimacy of the
rule, which in turn can impinge on its efficacy.180 Realist scholars
have seen the lack of clear guidance as a sign of the desuetude of
the rule.181 Others, especially scholars affiliated with critical legal
studies, have seen the indeterminacy of the rule as manifesting a
retreat to politics, thereby confirming the failure to depoliticize this
area of inter-state relations.182 While positivist scholars have
classically endorsed the position advocated above and have not
180 See generally THOMAS N. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (Clarendon Press, 1995) (focusing on concepts of fairness to assess
international law).
181 Glennon, supra note 8, at 969 (noting that there is no guidance in
international law as to where the tipping point occurs between breaking the law
to desuetude).
182 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8
EUR. J. INT’L L. 566, 574 (1997) (finding that rules become political when they are
over and under inclusive, as often is the case with international law). The
argument is not only made by critical legal scholars. See, e.g, Jan Klabbers, Off
Limits? International Law and the Excessive Use of Force, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
LAW 59, 67 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol7
/iss1/art4 (discussing the political dimension of warfare and the inevitability that
politics will seep into the equation).
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considered that the clarity of the command of a rule is without any
impact on its legal quality,183 some have nonetheless considered its
normative quality instrumental in its legal character.184
There are thus diverging interpretations of the decomposition
of the prohibition on the use of force. However one construes the
inability of a rule to formulate clear guidance, most scholars will
see the growing obscurity shrouding the prohibition on the use of
force as evidence of its incremental dilution. Against this
backdrop, it no longer seems far-fetched to contend that the
current practice has ushered in the demise of the prohibition on the
use of force, the consequences of which on the international legal
order must now be appraised.
5.

THE PROSPECT OF A LEGAL ORDER DEVOID OF A CLEAR
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE

The evaporation of the prohibition on the use of force, whether
through softness, inefficacy, or desuetude, seems compelling.
Even the I.C.J.—which has not stood idle185 and sometimes taken
very unorthodox positions to ensure that it is granted the
opportunity to defend the rule186—has not managed to rein in this
See Christakis, supra note 142.
See Robert Ago, Science Juridique et Droit International, 90 RECUEIL DES
COURS 851, 912, 923–27 (1957) (discussing functional positivism). His positivist
theory is further spelled out in Robert Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51
AM. J. INT’L L. 691 (1957). Such a functionalist approach of positivism should not
be conflated with the realist objection to positivism, which was also denoted as
‘functional.’ See Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International
Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260, 274 (1940) (observing that “realist” jurisprudence is
actually “functional” jurisprudence). For another author elevating normativity to
a constitutive element of legality, see Hans Kelsen, Théorie générale du droit
international public, problèmes choisis, 42 RECUEIL DES COURS 117, 138 (1932).
185 Some defendant states have relentlessly argued that cases involving the
use of force are non-justiciable. For a discussion of this argument and its rejection
by the court, see Christine Gray, The Use and Abuse of the International Court of
Justice: Cases Concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 867
(2003).
186 For instance, in a very inelegant manner, the court made suspect use of the
principle of systemic integration enshrined in Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in the Oil Platforms case in order to appraise
the conduct of the United States in light of the principles pertaining to the use of
force, whereas the treaty of commerce and navigation which constituted its sole
ground for jurisdiction was alien to these rules. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
2003 I.C.J. 161, 199 para. 78 (Nov. 6) (holding that use of force here was
unjustified); Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article
183

184
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tendency. Although it is unclear whether it behooves international
legal scholars to militate for the protection of the collective security
system,187 many authors have also vigorously reacted against the
aforementioned practice.188 As with attempts made by the I.C.J.,
the protestations of scholars have not sufficed to avert any further
subversion of the limitations on the prohibition on the use of force.
Since the corrosion of the prohibition on the use of force thus looks
irresistible, it is of great interest to reflect, in the last part of this
Article, on the possible outcome of its complete demise for the
international legal order as a whole.
The exercise that is undertaken in this section would probably
look odd for those who, like constitutional scholars, have placed
the prohibition on the use of force and the collective security
system at the center of the hierarchical and value-based
understanding of the international legal order.189 Drawing on the
aforementioned practice, it is argued here that that the following
undertaking does not constitute a fanciful reflection in any sense.
The harbingers mentioned above are too serious not to be taken
into account and we must ponder the possible disappearance of the
prohibition on the use of force.
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279, 280 (2005) (explaining
that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’s application in Oil Platforms has
strengthened international law at a critical time when international law was facing
fragmentation). For a similar criticism of the court’s judgment in Oil Platforms, see
Jorg Kammerhofer, Oil’s Well that Ends Well? Critical Comments on the Merits
Judgment in the Oil Platforms Case, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 695, 696–700 (2004). For
another judgment where the court forcefully dealt with issues pertaining to the
use of force, see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, paras.
121–39 (Feb. 26) (describing the court’s resort to the sui generis character of the
situation to which it applied the principle res iudicata in a manner that disregards
the classical requirements of Article 35 of the Statute).
187 For some reflections on the role of scholars, see d’Aspremont, supra note
172.
188 See Matthew Craven et al., We Are Teachers of International Law, 17 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 363, 363 (2004) (discussing the concept of collective security and selfdefense within the context of the United States’ most recent war in Iraq); see also
Centre de droit international, Appel de juristes de Droit international concernant le
recors a la force contre l’Irak, January 2003, available at http://www.humanrights.ch
/home/upload/pdf/030513_aufruf_f.pdf.
189 On Constitutionalism in general see TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2007); Richard Collins, Constitutionalism as Liberal-Juridical
Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 251 (2009);
Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal
from Germany, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 223, 223 (2006).
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The potential consequences of a dilution of the prohibition on
the use of force for the international legal order could be manifold.
It could bear upon the legal order itself and on the collective
security system. These two distinct dimensions of the fallout of the
dilution of the prohibition on the use of force are examined below.
5.1. The International Legal Order
The prohibition on the use of force is commonly extolled,
eulogized and, very often, elevated to the higher rank of the norms
governing the international society to such an extent that its
disintegration can only be understood by some scholars as a return
to a pre-1928 Hobbesian state of nature. This Article argues that
attempting to gauge the impact of the dilution of the prohibition
on the use of force does not in any way amount to examining the
unraveling of the international legal order itself. It is nonetheless
true, as is well known, that Hobbes contends that bestowing the
monopoly of the entitlement to use force upon one sovereign
constitutes the foundational act of any society and, hence, makes
the existence of a legal order possible.190 Thus, from a Hobbesian
vantage point, one may be tempted to believe that the elimination
of any constraints on the use of force could lead to the demise of
the legal order itself.
It is, however, argued here that such an understanding of the
consequences of the demise of the collective security system would
be overkill. First, because it is not at all certain that the vanishing
of the prohibition to use force would necessarily pave the way for
utter chaos. The possibility that States resort to force can be
curtailed by many non-legal factors, including public opinion,191
balance of power, or arguments of morality.192 More importantly,
190 Hobbes has been perceived as the precursor of so many radically opposite
understandings of the international society. One classical view of Hobbes links
him to the realist theories of international law. For a criticism of the neo-realist
understandings of Hobbes, see Donald W. Hanson, Thomas Hobbes’s “Highway to
Peace,” 38 INT’L ORG. 329 (1984). For a neo-Hobbesian understanding of the
international law-making processes, see d’Aspremont, supra note 58.
191 See generally Charlotte Ku & Harol K. Jacobson, Toward a Mixed System of
Democratic Accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2003) (suggesting that accountability is one way to moderate the use
of force).
192 Klabbers, supra note 182, at 67 (“international humanitarian law attempts
to pay tribute to moral considerations”).
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the prohibition on the use of force is not at all a constitutive
element of any legal order. A legal order can leave the freedom of
its subjects to fight each other unfettered without putting its own
existence into question. This is easily illustrated by the fact that
nobody ever contested the legal character of the international order
when the use of force was only loosely regulated in the framework
of the League of Nations, before it came to be prohibited by the
1928 Kellog-Briand Treaty, by customary international law or later
by the U.N. Charter.193 The prohibition on the use of force—as
explained earlier—may well be part of what Hart calls the
minimum content of natural law, that is, some of the rules that
make a legal order viable.194 But this does not mean that a legal
order’s existence is dependent on the use of force being prohibited.
In this sense, a possible disintegration of the prohibition on the use
of force would not mean reverting to a pre-legal stage where
international relations were not governed by law. As was alluded
to above, it could even be defended that, from an Austinian and
Kelsenian vantage point, because law boils down to a set of rules
that can be coercively enforced,195 a greater freedom to resort to
force can even be seen as enhancing the threat of sanction for
violations of international law and harden the constraints on which
the order in question is based.
5.2. The International Collective Security System
It has been argued, so far, that the demise of the prohibition on
the use of force would not undermine the legal character of the
international order. Despite the ban on the use of force being

193 See League of Nations Covenant arts. 12–13 & 15–16 (legislating that, in
the event there is a conflict between two countries, the dispute should be
submitted to arbitration or the Council for resolution).
194 HART, supra note 27, at 193–94.
195 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 201 (The Noonday Press 1954) (stating that
the duties the law imposes “are enforced by moral sanctions: by hear on the part
of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns”); Hans Kelsen, Théorie du Droit
International Public, 84 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, at 12–13 (1953) (describing the
function of the law as that of leading mankind to abstain from committing specific
acts that are deemed to be detrimental and suggesting the infliction of harm on
those that deviate as a means of enforcing the law); see also Kelsen, supra note 184,
at 124. (characterizing the law as a system of constraint, with the founding norms
of the judicial system prescribing said constraint).
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classically deemed a “cornerstone of the U.N. Charter,”196 this
Article submits that it is the current collective security system that
will be the most affected by any dilution of the prohibition on the
use of force. It is not that the disappearance of the prohibition on
the use of force would jeopardize the existence of the collective
security system. Rather, it is that the impact of the demise of the
prohibition on the use of force would bring about a fundamental
overhaul of the essence of that system. More precisely, it is argued
here that the disintegration of the prohibition on the use of force
will be followed by a radical transformation of the U.N. system.
To understand the revolutionary impact on the U.N. system
that could follow a significant dilution of Article 2(4), it is
important to stress preliminarily that the demise of the prohibition
on the use of force would certainly not bring about the dissolution
of the U.N. First, because even if it is demonstrated that, short of
the prohibition enshrined in Article 2(4), the U.N. has outlived its
usefulness, the dissolution of the U.N. still requires the formal
termination of its constitutive treaty by Member States.197 It is not
at all certain that States would accept formal termination the U.N.
Charter even if it were proven that force is no longer prohibited.
Second, and more importantly, although regulating the use of force
and maintaining peace and security was originally conceived as
the overarching function of the organization, the disintegration of
Article 2(4) would not annihilate the raison d’être of the U.N.

196 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 148 (Dec. 19).
197 See Articles of Agreement of the World Bank art. VI, Feb. 16, 1989, 60 Stat.
1457, 2 U.N.T.S. 180 (stating that permanent suspension of World Bank operations
requires agreement by a majority of the Governors); Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund sec. 2, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39
(demonstrating that there are a few constitutive treaties of international
organizations that provide for the liquidation of the international organization
concerned by one of its organs); see also Agreement on the Establishment of the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) art. XIV, Mar. 9,
1995, 1873 U.N.T.S. 417 (“This Agreement may be amended, terminated, or
suspended by written agreement of all Executive Board Members, or, if such
agreement is not achievable by written agreement of a majority of the Executive
Board Members.”); Kigab Park, Korea Univ., Legal Problems Arising from the
Dissolution of an International Organization: the Case of the Korean Peninsular
Energy Development Organization (KEDO): Dissolution de facto or Hibernation?,
Presentation at the Biennal Conference of the European Society of International
Law (Sept. 5, 2008) (discussing the legal difficulties pertaining to the situation of
KEDO).
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Indeed, the U.N. is not exclusively entrusted with curtailing
violence in the international arena. The U.N. performs many other
tasks, which are only loosely related to the maintenance of peace
and security. No State could convincingly claim termination for
impossibility of performance198 or fundamental change of
circumstances.199 In this sense, the U.N. would no doubt outlive
the unraveling of the prohibition on the use of force.
It follows from the foregoing that, in the case of a dilution of
Article 2(4), regulatory powers utilized by the organs of the U.N.,
and especially the Security Council, would remain at the disposal
of the Member States, irrespective of the state of the law regarding
the use of force. The use of these regulatory instruments, and
especially the powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, has
198

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 61:

1. A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility
results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object
indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is
temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the
operation of the treaty.
2. Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a
ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation
of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation
owed to any other party to the treaty.
199

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 62:

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence
of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty
establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a
breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or
of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the
treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing
from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending
the operation of the treaty.
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long surpassed the maintenance of international peace and
security. Indeed, the practice of the Security Council within the
framework of Chapter VII of the Charter has long gone beyond the
original limits and purposes of the Charter. For instance, it is no
longer contested that some of the Security Council’s main
achievements lie in the non-military measures that it has
ordered.200 This is well illustrated by the fact that, now, the
Security Council is mostly using the powers conferred upon it by
Chapter VII for non-military purposes. Moreover, the measures
that are typically ordered by the Security Council are not
conceived as measures preceding a possible authorization to use
force. They are construed as the true end of the Council’s action.
By virtue of these non-military measures, it is well-known that
the Council has been implementing all sorts of policies:
reconstructing States,201 fighting impunity through the creation of
judicial bodies,202 fighting terrorism through the adoption of
individual sanctions,203 and so on. Additional tasks alien to the
maintenance of peace and security have been conferred upon the
Council through non-U.N. mechanisms such as the International
Criminal Court before which proceedings can be ignited by the

200 See generally Vera Gowlland-Debbas, UN Sanctions and International Law:
An Overview, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001) (discussing the debate over the legitimacy and longterm effects of economic sanctions on states); Tams, supra note 86, at 377
(discussing the Security Council’s adoption of “general ‘law-making’ resolutions”
where it has deemed military sanctions unnecessary).
201 See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 24 (condemning acts of violence against the
Kosovo population). See generally Jean d’Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administrations
as Democracy-Building Instruments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2008) (discussing the use of
international organizations to create or reconstruct democratic states); Jean
d’Aspremont, Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 649, 649 (2007) (arguing that the “proposed regulation of [the] statehood” of
Kosovo surpassed past international involvement in the reconstruction of States).
202 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (describing the
establishment of the ICTR); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(describing the establishment of the ICTY). See generally S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) (describing the creation of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon).
203 See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (declaring
international opposition to the Taliban); S.C. Res. 1135, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1135
(Oct. 29, 1997) (declaring international opposition to the members of the UNITA
in Angola).
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Council.204 This tendency is also underpinned by the current
debates about entrusting the Council with the responsibility of
making findings about the existence of crimes of aggression.205
Overall, the Council has increasingly vacated its role of guardian of
the order and has focused on problems of justice. In doing so, the
“Police” have ventured into the “Temple,” as was famously
described by Martti Koskenniemi.206 The promotion of justice by
the Security Council is obviously at odds with the original policing
role that was reserved to the Council by the authors of the Charter,
as well as by earlier practice, where classically it was the General
Assembly that could seek to promote justice on the international
plane.207 It is nonetheless this role that would enable the collective
security system to outlive the dilution of the prohibition on the use
of force.
It is not only that the relevance of the U.N. system would not
be jeopardized by a dilution of the prohibition on the use of force.
This Article also argues that the tendency of the Security Council to
embrace responsibilities in world regulation and the promotion of
justice would be dramatically inflated by a dilution of the
prohibition on the use of force. Indeed, in the absence of any clear
prohibition on the use of force, the Council’s responsibility to
204 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (establishing an “independent permanent International Criminal
Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole”).
205 See Press Conference, United Nations, Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.un.org/News/briefings
/docs/2009/090213_ICC.doc.htm (discussing the I.C.C.’s jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression). See generally Niels Blokker, The Crime of Aggression and the
United Nations Security Council, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 867, 886-87 (2007) (discussing
the debate over the Security Council’s role in determining I.C.C. jurisdiction, and
rejecting the view that the determination of whether there has been a crime of
aggression should be left exclusively to the Security Council).
206 Koskenniemi, supra note 19, at 328-29.
207 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (May 1, 1974)
(defining a new economic order to promote principles of justice and equity among
states); see also Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) (prohibiting colonialism in recognition of individual
rights to equality and self-determination); Request for an advisory opinion from
the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, G.A. Res. 49/75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (Dec. 15, 1994) (promoting
disarmament and requesting that the I.C.J. review the legality of the threat or use
of nuclear weapons).
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maintain order and to authorize the use of force to stem threats to
international peace would ebb. It would no longer be necessary to
seek authorization to use force and the maintenance of the
international peace and order would no longer be dependent on
the Council. States, acting unilaterally or on the basis of ad hoc
coalitions, would be able to maintain order.208 This is probably
what the idea of coalitions of the willing—which constitutes the
antithesis of the maintenance of order by the international
community209—already foreshadows.
Deprived of its main
responsibilities in the maintenance of order, the Security Council
would inextricably concentrate on its newer functions (i.e. world
regulation and the promotion of justice). It follows that the
Security Council would not necessarily be a victim of the dilution
of the prohibition on the use of force and would in fact expand its
role as a world regulator.
The idea that the responsibilities of the Security Council as a
world regulator or a forum of justice may be reinforced by the
demise of the prohibition on the use of force may, to some extent,
seem paradoxical, since the dilution of the prohibition on the use of
force is largely the outcome of States’ confidence in their own
powers and capabilities. On the one hand, states could be liberated
from most constraints on their ability to use force. On the other
hand, they would be subjected to a more powerful Council. This
paradox must not be exaggerated. The States that are striving to
extend the freedom to resort to force are commonly those that are
at the helm of the Council. By diluting the prohibition on the use
of force, these states are fostering their own ability to resort to war
as well as the international mechanisms by which they can impose
regulations and promote their own visions of justice.
However beneficial this may be for the superpowers, it is
beyond doubt that the demise of the Council’s role as guardian of
the order would also present one advantage for those states that do
not classically have a say in its regulation-making processes.
208 See Michael Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16,
34 (2003) (claiming that States will be able to maintain order without the help of
the Security Council).
209 See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Coalitions of the Willing and the Evolution of
Informal International Law, in COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: AVANTGARDE OR THREAT?
1 (Christian Calliess et al. eds., 2007) (describing the increasing tendency of “likeminded states” to use informal processes instead of international law to
coordinate).
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Indeed, if stripped of its primary function in regulating the use of
force, the Council would more clearly appear as what it currently
is. Today, under the guise of the collective security system, the
Council still manages to be portrayed as the guardian of peace and
order. All of its actions are justified by reference to that precise
goal despite the fact that the determination of a situation as
constituting a threat to the peace boils down to a mere formality210
and its powers are used for all sorts of different goals which are
only loosely connected to the maintenance of peace and security. If
someday the Council is deprived of its primary function as a result
of the unraveling of the prohibition on the use of force, it will
become more apparent that the Security Council has become a real
world regulator.
Laying bare and reinforcing this crude reality of a Security
Council turned into a world regulator would undoubtedly cause
some unease. It is uncontested that, as a forum of justice and as a
world regulator, the Council has proved to be an ill-equipped and
inappropriate body. It suffices to mention the debates about the
sanctions against individuals suspected of involvement in
international terrorism-related activities211 or the reluctance to
extend the role of the Security Council in international criminal
proceedings.212 Preserving a Council exclusively focused on
regulating the world and promoting justice would be contingent
upon dramatically reforming the Council.213 While the collective
security system has provided the illusion that we can live in a
world where security is the responsibility of a handful of vetowielding States enjoying wide discretionary powers,214 laying bare
210 See d’Argent, supra note 28, at 1145–46 (noting that the Security Council’s
responsibility under Article 39 to determine whether a situation constitutes a
threat relies on the maintenance of peace and international security).
211 See, e.g., d’Aspremont & Dopagne, supra note 71, at 375–76 (describing the
problems caused by the implementation of U.N. Security Council measures in the
European legal order).
212 See Press Conference, United Nations, supra note 205 (describing the
recent debates in the special study group on aggression).
213 See also Stromseth, supra note 5, at 629 (“We are . . . at a difficult and
precarious transitional moment in the international legal system governing the
use of force . . .”).
214 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 24 (Aug. 10, 2005) (discussing the discretion of the
Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to, or a breach of, the
peace). Contra Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 29 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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the crude reality of its global regulatory position would spark a
compelling and irresistible need for reform—especially in terms of
transparency, due process, and participation.
Does the foregoing mean that we should rejoice at the dilution
of the prohibition on the use of force because it could eventually
reinforce the calls for greater transparency, due process, and
participation in the collective security system? Not necessarily.
First, a larger leeway for resorting to war could pave the way for
an increase in violence despite the existence of non-legal
constraints through public opinions, economic parameters, or even
morality. Second, we need to bear in mind that the highly needed
reform of the Council has long proved politically unfeasible.215
Hence, it is not certain that, in the absence of such reform, a
Council exclusively transformed into a world legislator by virtue of
the complete liberalization of the use of force would be able to
wield its powers with the same legitimacy and efficacy. If an
increased inefficacy of the Council is the price to be paid for
removing the veil under which it has been acting since the end of
the Cold War, it may be wiser to continue to live under the illusion
of an international legal order where force is strictly prohibited and
its use carefully supervised by the Security Council.

215 See UN Begins Talks on Realigning Security Council, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb.
20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/world/americas
/20iht-nations.4.20340168.html (discussing the new round of talks about reform of
the Security Council that were ignited after the failure of the 2005 Summit to
address the reform of the Council). See also Francois Murphy, France, UK want
Interim Change to UN Body–Sarkozy, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2009, available at
http://in.reuters.com/article/economicNews/idINIndia-37489320090116
(discussing President Sarkozy’s proposal that the only reform within reach is an
informal agreement among veto-wielding powers to share their seats, particularly
among European members).
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